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INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“Federal Circuit”) decided numerous cases demonstrating the varied 
nature of the cases appealed from the United States Court of 
International Trade (“CIT”).  These cases included appeals to the 
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CIT from United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”), 
the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), and the 
United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”). 
Since its inception in 1982, the Federal Circuit has exercised its 
jurisdiction over cases appealed from the CIT pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(5).1  This broad grant of appellate jurisdiction is apparent 
in the wide variety of cases the Federal Circuit hears.  The complexity 
of these cases has continued to grow with numerous tariff 
classification and drawback cases, trade remedy cases, and 
jurisdictional issue cases, among others. 
This Article reviews those cases decided by the Federal Circuit in 
2007 dealing with international trade matters.  Many cases decided by 
the Federal Circuit had complex procedural histories and turned on 
particular factual issues.  However, some of the cases decided in 2007 
also had broader implications that potentially will affect agency 
decision-making for years to come.  The case summaries highlight the 
issues the Federal Circuit faced in 2007, broken down into the two 
major areas of the court’s international trade jurisdiction—customs 
laws and trade remedies laws. 
I. CUSTOMS 
As in previous years, in 2007, Customs cases represented a large 
number of international trade cases decided by the Federal Circuit.  
Since 2003, when Customs was reorganized as an agency within the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Circuit’s purview 
has centered primarily on Customs’ functions of “[a]ssessing and 
collecting Customs duties, excise taxes, fees and penalties due on 
imported merchandise.”2  In the 2007 term, the Federal Circuit heard 
cases involving tariff classification matters, and a wide range of other 
customs-related matters, including duty drawback and jurisdictional 
disputes. 
A. Tariff Classification 
The Federal Circuit decided seven classification cases in 2007.  In 
classification cases, importers and Customs disagree about the proper 
classification of imported goods under the provisions of the 
 
 1. “The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of 
International Trade.”  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2000). 
 2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs Service, http://www.cbp. 
gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/history/history2.xml (last visited Feb. 13, 2008). 
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Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”).3  
Because the HTSUS classification of imported goods determines the 
rate of duty that will be assessed on the goods, importers want the 
goods classified in an HTSUS provision with a lower duty rate than 
that in a potentially applicable alternative provision. 
In Optrex America, Inc. v. United States,4 the Federal Circuit addressed 
the classification of a variety of liquid crystal displays (“LCDs”) 
imported by Optrex America, Inc. (“Optrex”).5  These LCDs included 
alphanumeric modules, graphic modules, and glass sandwiches (or 
panels), used in a number of different settings.6  While Customs 
liquidated the imports under various subheadings, including 
8531.20.00 and 9013.80.70, of the HTSUS, the CIT ultimately found 
in favor of Customs’ counterclaims to reclassify certain imports under 
subheadings 9013.80.70,7 9013.80.90,8 and 8537.10.90.9  Optrex 
appealed, contending that its goods are classifiable as parts of 
automatic data processing (“ADP”) machines, classifiable under 
 
 3. OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED TARIFF 
SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (2007); see, e.g., Optrex Am., Inc. v. United States, 
475 F.3d 1367, 1367–72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (deciding a dispute between Optrex and 
Customs regarding the classification of Optrex’s imports under the provisions of the 
HTSUS). 
 4. 475 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 5. Id. at 1367–68. 
 6. Id. at 1368. 
 7. Subheading 9013.80.70 covers “Liquid crystal devices not constituting articles 
provided for more specifically in other headings; lasers, other than laser diodes; 
other optical appliances and instruments, not specified or included elsewhere in this 
chapter; parts and accessories thereof:  Flat panel displays other than for articles of 
heading 8528, except subheadings 8528.51 or 8528.61.”  Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000), Subheading 
9013.80.70.  The HTSUS is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1202, but is not published in the 
Code.  Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 3007, the HTSUS is published, as annotated for 
statistical reporting purposes, by the U.S. International Trade Commission.  See 
United States International Trade Commission, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 
United States, available at http://www.usitc.gov (follow “Tariff Schedule” hyperlink).
 8. Subheading 9013.80.90 covers “Liquid crystal devices not constituting articles 
provided for more specifically in other headings; lasers, other than laser diodes; 
other optical appliances and instruments, not specified or included elsewhere in this 
chapter; parts and accessories thereof:  Other.”  Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 
United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000), Subheading 9013.80.90. 
 9. Optrex, 475 F.3d at 1369.  Subheading 8537.10.90 covers  
Boards, panels, consoles, desks, cabinets and other bases, equipped with two 
or more apparatus of heading 8535 or 8536, for electric control or the 
distribution of electricity, including those incorporating instruments or 
apparatus of chapter 90, and numerical control apparatus, other than 
switching apparatus of heading 8517:  For a voltage not exceeding 1,000 V:  
Other.   
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000), 
Subheading 8537.10.90. 
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heading 8471, and ADP machine parts, classifiable under heading 
8473.10
Heading 8473 states that, “[t]o be classified as an ADP machine 
part, an import must be ‘suitable for use solely or principally with’ 
ADP machines.”11  The Notes to Chapter 84 define ADP machines as: 
Digital machines, capable of (1) storing the processing program or 
programs and at least the data immediately necessary for execution 
of the program; (2) being freely programmed in accordance with 
the requirements of the user; (3) performing arithmetical 
computations specified by the user; and (4) and [sic] executing, 
without human intervention, a processing program which requires 
them to modify their execution, by logical decision during the 
processing run . . . .12
The Federal Circuit found that, because Optrex failed to prove that 
its imports are solely or principally incorporated into machines 
meeting the second and third criteria listed above, the CIT correctly 
determined that they were not properly classified as parts of ADP 
machines under heading 8473.13
The Federal Circuit denied Optrex’s appeal for a number of 
reasons.  First, the court found that “Optrex ha[d] not established 
that any of its imports are incorporated into devices that are freely 
programmed in accordance with the requirements of the user.”14  
The court agreed with Customs’ interpretation of the “freely 
programmable” requirement,15 and this interpretation was also 
supported by the World Customs Organization’s Explanatory Notes.16  
Second, Optrex failed to establish that any of its imports were 
incorporated solely or principally into machines that are capable of 
performing arithmetical computations specified by the user.17  Once 
 
 10. Optrex, 475 F.3d at 1369. 
 11. Id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED 
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Heading 8473 (2006)). 
 12. Id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED 
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Chapter 84, Note 5(A)(a) (2006)). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1370 (citing U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters 
Ruling No. 964880 (Dec. 21, 2001)) (“Customs believes that a freely programmable 
ADP machine is one that applications can be written for, does not impose artificial 
limitations upon such applications, and will accept new applications that allow the user 
to manipulate the data as deemed necessary by the user.” (emphasis added)). 
 16. Id. (“[M]achines which operate only on fixed programs, that is programs 
which cannot be modified by the user, are excluded [from heading 8471] even 
though the user may be able to choose between a number of such fixed programs.” 
(citing CUSTOMS CO-OPERATION COUNCIL, HARMONIZED COMMODITY DESCRIPTION AND 
CODING SYSTEM, Explanatory Note 84.71(I)(A) (2d ed. 1996))). 
 17.  Id. 
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the CIT determined that none of the imports were classifiable under 
heading 8473, it classified the imported LCDs under either heading 
8531 (signaling devices), 8537 (control panels), or 9013 (LCDs not 
constituting articles provided for more specifically in other 
headings).18  The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s classification of:  
certain graphic display modules as control panels under subheading 
8537.10.90,19 all character display models capable of displaying eighty 
or less characters as indicator panels under subheading 8531.20.00,20 
and certain LCD panels and character display modules capable of 
displaying more than eighty characters under subheading 9013.21  
While this finding was based on a Customs classification policy that 
was merely a guideline and not a rigid rule, Optrex did not present 
any evidence showing that its imported character display modules 
were not limited to signaling.22  Therefore, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the CIT’s decision in favor of Customs’ classification of the 
LCDs.23
BASF Corp. v. United States24 involved the tariff classification of 
Lucarotin® 1% (“Lucarotin”), a food colorant containing one 
percent beta-carotene.25  In this case, both the importer BASF 
Corporation (“BASF”) and the government appealed the decision of 
the CIT, which held that Lucarotin was classifiable under subheading 
3204.19.35 of the HTSUS (“Beta-carotene and other carotene 
coloring matter”).26  BASF argued that the product was entitled to 
duty-free treatment because beta-carotene is listed on the duty-free 
Pharmaceutical Appendix of the HTSUS.27  The government cross-
appealed, stating that the correct classification of Lucarotin is as a 
beta-carotene “preparation not otherwise specified” under 
subheading 3204.19.40 or 3204.19.50.28  The Federal Circuit affirmed 
 
 18.  Id. 
 19. See id. at 1371 n.4 (finding no error in the classification because the display 
modules contained touch panels). 
 20. See id. at 1371 (applying Customs’ eighty character rule by considering all 
LCD modules capable of displaying eighty characters or less as being operationally 
limited to performing signaling functions, and determining that while this was 
merely a guideline and not a rigid rule, Optrex did not present any evidence 
showing that its imported character display modules were not limited to signaling). 
 21. See id. at 1371–72 (finding no error in the CIT’s classification of these LCDs 
as LCDs “not constituting articles provided for more specifically in other headings”). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1372. 
 24. 482 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 25. Id. at 1325. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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the CIT’s decision to classify Lucarotin under subheading 3204.19.35 
of the HTSUS.29
In finding against BASF, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT’s 
classification under subheading 3204.19.35 of the HTSUS prevailed 
over the listing of beta-carotene on the Pharmaceutical Appendix.30  
Lucarotin’s use as a food colorant, and not as a vitamin, was never 
disputed.31  The CIT found that Lucarotin’s use did not comply with 
the ITC’s definition of a pharmaceutical product,32 and found that 
customers only bought the product for its properties as a food 
colorant.33  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s holding 
that Lucarotin was not eligible for duty-free importation despite the 
listing of beta-carotene on the Pharmaceutical Appendix.34
In finding against the government, the Federal Circuit held that 
the CIT’s classification under subheading 3204.19.35 was correct 
because the classification as “Beta-carotene and other carotenoid 
coloring matter” was more specific than the government’s proposed 
classification under 3204.19.40 or 3204.19.50 as a beta-carotene 
“preparation not otherwise specified.”35  The Federal Circuit relied on 
HTSUS General Rule of Interpretation (“GRI”) 3 to guide its 
analysis.36  GRI 3(a) states that “[t]he heading which provides the 
most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a 
more general description.”37  GRI 3(b) states that mixtures or 
composite goods which cannot be classified by reference to 3(a) 
“shall be classified as if they consisted of the material or the 
component which gives them their essential character.”38  Therefore, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that the “most specific description” 
criterion of GRI 3(a) and/or the “essential character” criterion of 
 
 29. Id. at 1327. 
 30. See id. (asserting that the CIT’s decision represented “the clearest and most 
direct application of the HTSUS provision of a separate tariff category for beta-
carotene coloring matter”). 
 31. Id. at 1326. 
 32. Id. (explaining that “[t]he CIT applied the International Trade 
Commission’s . . . definition of a pharmaceutical product as ‘used in the prevention, 
diagnosis, alleviation, treatment, or cure of disease in humans or animals’”). 
 33. See id. (asserting that the purpose of Lucarotin as a method of delivering a 
beta-carotene colorant was undisputed). 
 34. Id. at 1326–27. 
 35. Id. at 1327. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED 
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(a) (2007) 
(preferring the “heading which provides the most specific description”)).  
 38. See id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED 
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(b) (2007) 
(classifying mixtures “as if they consisted of the material or the component which 
gives them their essential character”)). 
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GRI 3(b) compelled the classification of Lucarotin under subheading 
3204.19.35.39  The government’s contention that Lucarotin is a 
“preparation” therefore did not carry much weight in light of the fact 
that subheading 3204.19.35 was plainly the more specific of the 
potential classifications.40
In another BASF Corp. v. United States41 case, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the CIT’s decision to classify the imported chemical 
polyisobutylene amine (“PIBA”) under subheading 3811.90.00 of the 
HTSUS.42  After importing PIBA, BASF added other chemicals to 
form a finished detergent control package, which was then added to 
gasoline engines to remove and prevent the buildup of harmful 
deposits.43  BASF argued that the product was not prima facie 
classifiable under heading 3811 (prepared additives for mineral oils 
(including gasoline)) and should be classified in subheading 
3902.20.50 (classifying chemicals by structure).44
The Federal Circuit rejected BASF’s argument, finding that PIBA 
was prima facie classifiable under heading 3811.45  In its analysis, the 
court found that, while the imported PIBA was not directly added to 
engines itself, “its detergent properties render[ed] it useful as a 
gasoline additive so long as other materials [were] added at the same 
time.”46  Additionally, the Federal Circuit held that heading 3811, a 
use provision, was more specific than heading 3902, an eo nomine 
provision, which described the product by name, not use.47  
Therefore, the court concluded that the CIT’s classification was 
correct because the imported product was prima facie classifiable in 
heading 3811 and because heading 3811 was more specific than 
heading 3902.  This, coupled with the Explanatory Notes to Chapter 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 497 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 42. See id. at 1311 (determining that the CIT was correct “[b]ecause the imported 
product is prima facie classifiable in heading 3811 of the HTSUS, and because 
heading 3811 is more specific than the heading in which BASF argues the product 
should be classified”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1312; see id. (explaining BASF’s arguments that (1) the imported 
product is mixed with other chemicals before being added to gasoline and is thus 
not a “prepared additive for gasoline” falling under heading 3811, and (2) heading 
3902 more specifically captures the true character of the product). 
 45. Id. at 1314–15. 
 46. Id. at 1314. 
 47. See id. at 1315 (explaining the court’s decision to follow the general rule that 
use provisions are more specific than eo nomine provisions, as well as the court’s 
application of the Explanatory Note corresponding to Chapter 39 of the HTSUS to 
support its decision). 
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39,48 compelled the Federal Circuit to affirm the CIT’s determination 
that the imported product should be classified in heading 3811.49
Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States50 involved the appeal by 
Customs of a CIT decision reclassifying 105 models of imported light 
fixtures.51  The case originally involved the classification of 124 
models of light fixtures imported by Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. 
(“Home Depot”), which Customs classified under HTSUS 
subheading 9405.10.80 as light fixtures made of a base metal other 
than brass, subject to a 7.6% duty.52  Home Depot argued that these 
imports were better classified under subheading 9405.10.80, as light 
fixtures made of something other than base metal, and should thus 
be subject to only a 3.9% duty.53  The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
CIT’s decision, agreeing with Home Depot and reclassifying the light 
fixtures under 9405.10.80.54
While both parties agreed that the proper first-level subheading for 
the subject goods is 9405.10, they disputed which of the two potential 
second-level subheadings covered the light fixtures.55  In its analysis, 
the Federal Circuit applied the GRI provisions in numerical order, 
starting with GRI 2(b).  Under GRI 2(b), because the light fixtures at 
issue consisted of more than one material or substance, the 
classifications of the goods were to be determined according to the 
principles of GRI 3.56  Applying GRI 3(a), the Federal Circuit 
determined that “[t]he two subheadings at issue ‘each refer to part 
only of the materials’ contained in the subject goods, so they must be 
‘regarded as equally specific’ pursuant to GRI 3(a).”57
The Federal Circuit then turned to GRI 3(b), “which instructs that 
the goods should be classified as if they consisted of the material or 
component which gives them their essential character.”58  The 
 
 48. “When as a result of the addition of certain substances, the resultant products 
answer to the description in a more specific heading elsewhere . . . they are excluded 
from Chapter 39.”  OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED 
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Chapter 39, Explanatory Notes 718 (3d ed. 
2002). 
 49. BASF Corp., 497 F.3d at 1316. 
 50. 491 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 51. Id. at 1335. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1336. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED 
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(a) (3d ed. 
2002)). 
 58. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED 
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(a) (2007)). 
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essential character test is a fact-intensive analysis.  Customs argued 
that a light fixture’s essential character is derived from the material 
that forms its structural framework.  The Federal Circuit rejected that 
argument, holding that under the essential character test’s fact-
intensive analysis, many factors should be considered when 
determining the essential character of a light fixture, including but 
not limited to those factors enumerated in Explanatory Note VIII to 
GRI 3(b).59  Thus, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the 
CIT’s factual analysis, and affirmed the CIT’s determinations to 
reclassify the light fixtures under subheading 9405.10.80.60
In Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States,61 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the classification of apparel items that the importer, 
Michael Simon Design, Inc. (“MSD”), claimed were properly 
classified as duty free “festive articles” under chapter 95 of the 
HTSUS.62  The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of MSD on 
several styles, holding they were “festive articles” properly classified 
under chapter 95.63  The government appealed the grant of summary 
judgment to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the articles were 
properly classified under chapters 61 or 62, which cover sports 
clothing and dress shirts and do impose a duty.64  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the CIT’s determination.65
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit again held that utilitarian articles 
can be classified as festive articles under heading 9505.66  The Federal 
Circuit found that “the tariff heading unambiguously includes festive 
apparel when construed in light of the section and chapter notes, 
 
 59. Id. at 1336–37 (“The factor which determines essential character will vary as 
between different kinds of goods . . . [and] may . . . be determined by the nature of 
the material or component, its bulk, quantity, weight or value, or by the role of a 
constituent material in relation to the use of the goods.” (quoting OFFICE OF TARIFF 
AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, General Rule of Interpretation 3(b), Explanatory Note VIII (2007)). 
 60. Id. at 1337. 
 61. 501 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 62. Id. at 1305. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1307. 
 66. Id. at 1305–06.  The court rejected the government’s argument that 
utilitarian articles are not classifiable as festive articles under heading 9505, citing the 
court’s similar decisions in Midwest of Cannon Falls, Inc. v. United States, 122 F.3d 1423, 
1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997), where the Federal Circuit held that “[n]othing from the 
pertinent subheading 9505.90.60—‘other festive, carnival or other entertainment 
articles’—limits 9505.90.60 to only ‘non-utilitarian’ items,” and Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. 
United States, 347 F.3d 922, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2003), where the Federal Circuit classified 
napkins, placemats, and rugs bearing Halloween and Christmas symbols as festive 
articles, finding that their utilitarian functions did not preclude them from 
classification therein.  Id. 
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which are binding.”67  Additionally, a legal note to section XI of the 
HTSUS, which covers chapters 61 and 62, clarifies that the section 
does not cover articles of chapter 95.68  The Federal Circuit noted 
that this was evidence that “the tariff scheme contemplates articles 
falling into both apparel and festive article categories, and [that] it 
expressly resolve[d] this conflict in favor of classification in chapter 
95.”69  Lastly, the government argued that an amendment to the 
Explanatory Notes expressly excluded articles having a utilitarian 
function from classification as a festive article.70  However, the Federal 
Circuit noted that the Explanatory Notes are not binding, but are 
merely interpretive guides.71  The Federal Circuit cited Rubie’s Costume 
Co. v. United States72 for the proposition that, “although the examples 
in the Explanatory Notes are probative and sometimes illuminating,” 
the court did not have to “employ their limiting characteristics . . . to 
narrow the language of the classification heading itself.”73  Therefore, 
in light of the unambiguous tariff heading, the Federal Circuit 
determined not to afford the Explanatory Notes any weight.74  Thus, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination to classify the 
articles under chapter 95.75
Degussa Corp. v. United States76 involved the classification of certain 
surface-modified silicon dioxide imported by Degussa Corporation 
(“Degussa”).77  The silicon dioxide at issue had been treated with 
hydrocarbon moieties, which caused the natural, unmodified 
hydrophilic (water-attractive) silica to become hydrophobic (water-
repellant).78  The government appealed the CIT’s classification of the 
imported silicon dioxide under subheading 2811.22.50 of the 
HTSUS, which provides for “Silicon dioxide:  Other” and applies no 
duty.79  On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT, finding that 
Degussa’s products contained certain impermissible impurities that 
precluded classification under heading 2811, and the court classified 
 
 67. Id. at 1306. 
 68. See id. (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED 
TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Section XI, Note 1(t) (2007)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1307. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 337 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 73. Michael Simon Design, 501 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Rubie’s Costume Co., 337 F.3d 
at 1359). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 508 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 77. Id. at 1045. 
 78. Id. at 1046. 
 79. Id. at 1047. 
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the products under Chapter 38, which covers goods of 
“Miscellaneous chemical industries.”80
The Federal Circuit determined that silicon dioxide with added 
hydrocarbons for the express purpose of making the surface 
hydrophobic contained impermissible impurities and could not be 
classified under chapter 28 of the HTSUS.81  The Federal Circuit 
relied on chapter 28, Note 1(a) of the HTSUS, which provides:  
“except where context otherwise requires, the headings of this 
chapter apply only to:  (a) Separate chemical elements and separate 
chemical defined compounds, whether or not containing 
impurities.”82  The Explanatory Note stated that “products with added 
water-repellants are . . . excluded from Chapter 28 because such 
agents modify the original characteristics of the products.”83  Thus, 
the Federal Circuit determined that Degussa’s surface-treated silicon 
dioxide contained impermissible impurities (water-repellants) and 
were not properly classified under Chapter 28.84  The Federal Circuit 
reversed the CIT and held that Customs had properly classified the 
surface modified silica products under subheading 3824.90.80 
covering “chemical products and preparations of the chemical and 
allied industries.”85
Motorola, Inc. v. United States86 was brought before the Federal 
Circuit again when Motorola, Inc. (“Motorola”) contested the CIT’s 
remand determination on the classification of various circuits 
imported by Motorola for use in cellular phone battery packs.87  This 
time, the Federal Circuit addressed whether goods entered by the 
bypass procedure, meaning that they were not inspected by Customs 
for a determination of the proper HTSUS classification, qualified as 
“treatment” under 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), such that any changes to the 
classification would require notice and comment procedures.88  
 
 80. Id. at 1045–46. 
 81. Id. at 1050–51. 
 82. Id. at 1049 (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, 
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Chapter 28, General Note 1(a) 
(2007)).  Chapter notes are part of the statutory text of the HTSUS and, therefore, 
are legally binding.  Id. at 1047.  While Explanatory Notes are generally non-binding, 
they may be consulted for guidance and are generally indicative of the proper 
interpretation of tariff provisions.  Id. 
 83. Id. at 1048 (citing OFFICE OF TARIFF AFFAIRS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, 
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, Chapter 28, General Note 1(a), 
Explanatory Note) (2007). 
 84. Id. at 1050. 
 85. Id. at 1051. 
 86. 509 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 87. Id. at 1369. 
 88. Id. at 1370–71. 
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Customs had issued pre-classification ruling letters (“PRLs”) 
classifying certain circuits previously imported by Motorola under a 
duty-free HTSUS provision, subheading 8542.40.00.  Several years 
later, Motorola imported other circuit models, and Customs 
liquidated them without inspection under the same PRL subheading.  
Motorola filed some 900 entries under this procedure.  Customs later 
reclassified these circuits under a different subheading that imposed 
a 3.2% duty.  The CIT determined that the goods imported pursuant 
to the PRLs were not “treated” for the purposes of § 1625(c), so 
Customs’ reclassification was proper, even without prior notice and 
an opportunity for comment.89  Motorola appealed this 
determination, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s 
determination.90
The Federal Circuit found that Motorola could not satisfy all of the 
requirements set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c),91 under which 
importers may claim “treatment” as set forth in § 1625(c)(2).92  The 
Federal Circuit found that the 900 entries that Motorola cited could 
not satisfy subsection (c) because there were never any actual 
examinations or determinations that any of those transactions 
qualified for inclusion under schedule 8542.40.00 of the HTSUS.93  
Further, the Federal Circuit rejected Motorola’s argument that the 
PRLs alone satisfy subsection (c).94  Noting that the PRLs are prior 
interpretive rulings that bind Customs only with respect to the items 
identified in the PRLs and not any other merchandise, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination that Customs did not violate 
section 1625(c) in classifying the entries under subheading 
8536.30.80 of the HTSUS.95
 
 89. Id. at 1371. 
 90. Id. at 1372. 
 91. 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c) provides that: 
(i) There must be evidence to establish that: 
(A) There was an actual determination by a Customs officer regarding 
the facts and issues involved in the claimed treatment; 
(B) The Customs officer making the actual determination was 
responsible for the subject matter on which the determination was 
made; and 
(C) Over a 2-year period immediately preceding the claim of treatment, 
Customs consistently applied that determination on a national basis as 
reflected in liquidations of entries or reconciliations or other Customs 
actions with respect to all or substantially all of that person’s Customs 
transactions involving materially identical facts and issues . . . . 
19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c) (2002), cited in Motorola, 509 F.3d at 1371. 
 92. Motorola, 509 F.3d at 1372 (citations omitted). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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Although classification decisions typically are only of interest for 
importers of goods identical, or at least similar, to those at issue in 
the decided cases, occasionally a decision of the Federal Circuit 
provides guidance on general principles of HTSUS classification.  For 
example, in 2007, in Degussa, Home Depot, and Optrex, the court 
suggested the potential importance of the Explanatory Notes, 
particularly in instances where they elucidate the meaning of HTSUS 
legal notes or tariff provisions.96  In Michael Simon Design, on the other 
hand, the Federal Circuit noted that it is not bound by the language 
of the Explanatory Notes.97  In Motorola, the court demonstrated that 
Customs’ interpretive regulations can be used to determine whether 
Customs has complied with 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).98
B. Drawback Claims 
Two Federal Circuit opinions in 2007 addressed claims for 
drawback.  Drawback is defined as “the refund or remission, in whole 
or in part, of a customs duty, fee or internal revenue tax which was 
imposed on imported merchandise under Federal law because of its 
importation.”99
In Merck & Co. v. United States,100 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
CIT’s determination that 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j)(4)(A) prohibited 
drawback for substituted merchandise exported to a NAFTA country 
unless the imported merchandise was of the type listed in 19 U.S.C. 
§ 3333(a).101  This case involved Merck’s importation of thirty-five 
kilograms of famotidine102 to the United States from Ireland, at a duty 
rate of 6.9% ad valorem, on May 25, 1993.103  Two years later, Merck 
imported an additional 1195 kilograms of famotidine, duty free, 
 
 96. See Degussa Corp. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1044, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(finding that the Explanatory Notes provided insight into the meaning of a term 
important to the analysis of the case); Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 491 
F.3d 1334, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying a test set forth in the Explanatory 
Notes); Optrex America, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(asserting that the Explanatory Notes inform the court’s analysis). 
 97. Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 98. See 509 F.3d at 1371–72 (deferring to Customs’ interpretation of its 
regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c) (2002), in Customs’ determination of whether it 
had complied with the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2000)). 
 99. Merck & Co. v. United States, 499 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting 
19 C.F.R. § 191.2(i) (2002)). 
 100. 499 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 101. Id. at 1353. 
 102. See id. at 1351 n.2 (“Famotidine chemical is formulated into famotidine 
tablets and is marketed under the trademark PEPCID.”). 
 103. Id. at 1351. 
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pursuant to the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement.104  Around that 
same time, Merck exported thirty-five kilograms of duty-free 
imported famotidine to Mexico and Canada.105  Merck filed a claim 
for drawback seeking a refund of the duties paid for the thirty-five 
kilograms of famotidine imported in 1993.106  It alleged that the 
exported merchandise was fungible with, and substituted for, the 
duty-paid imported merchandise, entitling Merck to drawback under 
§ 1313(j)(2).107  Customs denied the drawback, “reasoning that 
§ 1313(j)(4)(A)108 generally prohibits drawback for merchandise 
fungible with, and substituted for, the duty-paid imported 
merchandise when that merchandise is exported to a NAFTA 
country, unless it is of the type listed in § 3333.”109  Merck filed suit 
and sought reversal, asserting that the exported merchandise met 
one of the exceptions in § 3333(a), as a “good exported to a NAFTA 
country in the same condition as when imported.”110  The CIT agreed 
with the government’s argument that, because the imported duty-
paid merchandise itself was not subsequently exported, it could not 
qualify as a “good exported to a NAFTA country in the same 
condition as when imported,” under § 3333(a)(2), and therefore was 
subject to the NAFTA drawback restriction in § 1313(j)(4)(A).111
Both the CIT and Federal Circuit noted that the statute was 
ambiguous on its face, and therefore required consideration of 
various sources, including the legislative history, the regulations, and 
United States Customs Headquarters (“Customs HQ”) rulings, to 
ascertain Congress’ intent.112  “According to Merck, under the plain 
language of § 1313(j)(4)(A), the exceptions of § 3333(a) apply to the 
substituted exported merchandise, not to the duty-paid imported 
merchandise.”113  The government, on the other hand, contended 
that the imported merchandise had to be of the type listed in § 3333(a) 
for drawback to be permitted.114  The government argued that, 
because the duty-paid imported merchandise did not meet any of the 
exceptions in § 3333(a), § 1313(j)(4)(A) prohibited drawback.115
 
 104. Id. at 1351; see id. at n.3 (“Under the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement, 
tariffs on pharmaceutical products were eliminated, effective January 1, 1995.”).  
 105. Id. at 1352. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1352. 
 109. Id. at 1351. 
 110. Id. at 1351–52. 
 111. Id. at 1352. 
 112. Id. at 1354–55. 
 113. Id. at 1353 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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The Federal Circuit found that the legislative history made it clear 
that Congress enacted § 1313(j)(4)(A) in order to eliminate nearly 
all drawback for substituted goods exported to a NAFTA country.116  
The relevant NAFTA provision itself also made it clear that drawback 
on substituted merchandise was to be eliminated.117  Therefore, the 
court determined that permitting drawback for Merck’s exported 
merchandise would be contrary to the clear intent of Congress.118  
Further, Customs regulations119 and Customs HQ rulings120 supported 
this conclusion.  In particular, 19 C.F.R. § 181.41 and 19 C.F.R. 
§ 181.42 restricted or prohibited certain drawback on goods exported 
to Canada or Mexico on or after January 1, 1994.121  Customs HQ 
rulings were also consistent with these findings.122  The Federal 
Circuit therefore affirmed the CIT’s finding that the government’s 
interpretation of section 1313(j)(4)(A) was supported by the 
legislative history, Customs regulations, and Customs HQ rulings.123
 
 116. Id. at 1355. 
 117. Id. (citing North Am. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 3, Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 2 (1993)). 
 118. See id. (characterizing Merck’s attempt at obtaining drawback as “precisely 
the type of situation where Congress clearly intended to preclude drawback”). 
 119. In particular, the court relied on 19 C.F.R. § 181.41 and 19 C.F.R. § 181.42, as 
these regulations restricted or prohibited certain drawback on goods exported to 
Canada or Mexico on or after January 1, 1994.  Id. at 1356.  19 C.F.R. § 181.41  
provides:  “Subpart E.  Restrictions on Drawback and Duty-Deferral Programs.  This 
subpart sets forth the provisions regarding drawback claims and duty-deferral 
programs under Article 303 of the NAFTA and applies to any good that is a ‘good 
subject to NAFTA drawback’ within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. 3333.”  19 C.F.R. 
§ 181.41 (2007).  19 C.F.R. § 181.42 provides: 
The following duties or fees which may be applicable to a good entered for 
consumption in the Customs territory of the United States are not subject to 
drawback under this subpart: . . . 
(d) Customs duties paid or owed under unused merchandise 
substitution drawback.  There shall be no payment of such drawback 
under 19 U.S.C. 1313(j)(2) on goods exported to Canada or Mexico on 
or after January 1, 1994. 
19 C.F.R. § 181.42 (2008). 
 120. The court cited one such ruling, Customs HQ Ruling No. 228209, where 
Customs considered the same issue and stated that “[w]e do not agree that the 
limitation in § 1313(j)(4) applies to the substituted merchandise which is not the 
basis of the drawback claim, but find that the limitation applies to the imported good 
which is the basis of the drawback claim.”  Merck, 499 F.3d at 1356 (citing U.S. 
Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters Ruling No. 228209 (Apr. 12, 
2002)).  Customs has taken similar positions in prior decisions.  See, e.g., id. (citing 
U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters Ruling No. 227272 (May 
1, 1997); U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters Ruling No. 
227876 (Aug. 21, 2000); U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Customs Headquarters 
Ruling No. 226541 (July 24, 1998)). 
 121. See supra note 119 (quoting from 19 C.F.R. § 181.41 and 19 C.F.R. § 181.42). 
 122. See supra note 120 (reviewing Customs Headquarters rulings). 
 123. Merck, 499 F.3d at 1357. 
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In Graham Engineering Corp. v. United States,124 the Federal Circuit 
faced the issue of whether a Customs regulation requiring a party to 
give notice of intent to export prior to the filing of a drawback claim 
was valid.125  In October of 2000, Graham Engineering Corp. 
(“Graham”) exported a blow molding machine that it had imported a 
few months earlier.126  Graham sought “unused merchandise 
drawback” pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j)(1), which “provides for a 
ninety-nine percent refund of duty paid if the imported merchandise 
upon which duty has been paid is exported within three years from 
entry without use in the United States before exportation.”127  
However, Customs denied its claim for drawback because Graham 
failed to provide notice of intent to export merchandise, as is 
required by 19 C.F.R. § 191.35(a).128
The sole issue before the court was whether Customs’ notice of 
intent to export regulation is valid.129  The CIT held that “the notice 
of intent to export regulation is based on statutory authority and 
therefore not unlawful on its face.”130  The CIT relied on United States 
v. Lockheed Petroleum Services, Inc.,131 which stated that drawback 
privileges “are expressly conditioned, by statute, upon compliance 
with such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Treasury shall 
prescribe.”132  The CIT further found that the regulation was 
reasonable and not unduly burdensome because the notice of intent 
to export required only certification of lack of use in the United 
States, information regarding importation and intended exportation, 
contact information, and the location of the merchandise.133
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination, recognizing 
that the rulemaking authority vested in Customs by § 1313(l)134 
explicitly conditions the benefits of § 1313 on compliance with 
 
 124. 510 F.3d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 125. Id. at 1387. 
 126. Id. at 1386. 
 127. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j)(1) (2000)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1388. 
 131. 709 F.2d 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 132. Id. at 1474. 
 133. Graham, 510 F.3d at 1388 (applying 19 C.F.R. § 191.35(b) (1998)). 
 134. This provision states: 
Allowance of the privileges provided for in this section shall be subject to 
compliance with such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall prescribe, which may include, but need not be limited to, the authority 
for the electronic submission of drawback entries and the designation of the 
person to whom any refund or payment of drawback shall be made. 
19 U.S.C. § 1313(l) (2000). 
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regulations Customs might prescribe.135  The Federal Circuit 
determined that the notice of intent to export is “reasonably related 
to the statute it serves.”136  Therefore, Customs acted within its 
statutory powers to promulgate and enforce its notice of intent to 
export regulation.137  Because the regulation was not satisfied by 
Graham, the Federal Circuit held that Customs properly rejected its 
drawback claim.138
The Merck decision demonstrates that, where the drawback statute 
or its related statutes are ambiguous, the Federal Circuit will use 
legislative history, as well as Customs’ interpretive regulations and 
rulings, to determine the meaning of the statutory language.139  The 
Graham decision shows that, where Congress has clearly delegated 
authority to Customs to promulgate interpretive regulations, those 
regulations are enforceable.140
C. Jurisdictional Issues 
The Federal Circuit decided one case in 2007 that addressed 
whether the CIT had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(i).  The court also decided another case in 2007 that 
addressed the timeliness of filing protests. 
In a non-precedential opinion, International Custom Products, Inc. v. 
United States (Int’l Custom Prods. II),141 International Custom Products, 
Inc. (“ICP”) appealed the CIT’s dismissal of one count of its 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.142  ICP was an importer and distributor of a milk-fat 
based product that was used as an ingredient in sauces, salad 
dressings, dips, and other food products.143  Prior to importing its 
product, ICP received an advance ruling letter from Customs that 
 
 135. Graham, 510 F.3d at 1389. 
 136. See id. (relying on Mourning v. Family Publications Service., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 
369 (1973), where the Supreme Court held that “when Congress provides express 
rulemaking authority to an agency in order to carry out the substantive provisions of 
a statute, a regulation promulgated under such authority is valid, so long as the 
regulation is ‘reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.’”). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Merck & Co. v. United States, 499 F.3d 1348, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(providing that, because the statutory scheme was a “confusing and inconsistent 
maze of twists and turns,” the court would consider sources such as legislative history, 
the regulations, and Headquarters Rulings to determine Congress’s intent). 
 140. See Graham, 510 F.3d at 1389 (determining that Customs’ regulation here was 
valid, as it was reasonably related to the purposes of the statute, and therefore was 
enforceable). 
 141. 214 F. App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 142. Id. at 993. 
 143. Id. at 994. 
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classified ICP’s product under subheading 2103.90.9091.144  ICP 
began importation of its product in April 1999, and continued until 
April 2005, when Customs issued a Notice of Action informing ICP 
that Customs was reclassifying ICP’s product under subheading 
0405.20.3000 of the HTSUS as a “dairy spread.”145  On May 6, 2005, 
ICP commenced its first action in the CIT challenging the Notice of 
Action.146  While the CIT found in favor of ICP, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the CIT’s holding of jurisdiction, vacated the judgment, and 
remanded for dismissal of the complaint.147  The Federal Circuit held 
that “the remedy provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) was not manifestly 
inadequate, and, accordingly, the CIT lacked jurisdiction under 
§ 1581(i) to determine the validity of the Notice of Action.”148
In the time between the government’s notice of appeal and the 
Federal Circuit’s decision, Customs published a Proposed Revocation 
notice in August 2005, and later a Revocation letter on November 2, 
2005, reclassifying ICP’s product as a “dairy spread” under 
subheading 0405.20.3000 of the HTSUS.149  On November 14, 2005, 
ICP brought another action in the CIT challenging Customs’ 
classification, and argued that the CIT had jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).150  The CIT dismissed the complaint, finding that 
it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because ICP failed to 
exhaust its protest administrative remedies under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1514 
and 1515 prior to filing with the CIT.151
The Federal Circuit addressed two arguments152 in deciding 
whether § 1581(a) jurisdiction was manifestly inadequate:  
(1) whether “§ 1581(a) jurisdiction ‘fundamentally alters the legal 
framework of the adjudication’” by requiring de novo review of the 
 
 144. See id. (noting that ICP’s product was classified as “white sauce”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (citing Int’l Custom Prods. v. United States (Int’l Custom Prods. I), 467 F.3d 
1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 148. Id. (citing Int’l Custom Prods. I, 467 F.3d at 1327); see id. at 995 (explaining 
that “jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) may not be invoked unless jurisdiction 
under another subsection of § 1581 is either unavailable or manifestly inadequate”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. at 994–95 (challenging the government’s motion to dismiss all counts 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 151. Id. at 995 (again citing the proposition that § 1581(i) jurisdiction exists only 
when jurisdiction under another subsection of the provision is “unavailable or 
manifestly inadequate”). 
 152. Id.  While ICP presented five arguments as to why § 1581(a) jurisdiction is 
manifestly inadequate, the Federal Circuit did not address the other three because 
they were rejected for the same reasons stated in the Court’s earlier opinion.  Id.  For 
the court’s reasoning in its earlier opinion, see International Custom Products I, 467 
F.3d at 1327–28. 
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CIT classification rather than review of the administrative record;153 
and (2) whether “§ 1581(a) jurisdiction is incapable of holding 
Customs accountable for its failure to comply with the notice and 
comment process mandated by 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).”154  In addressing 
the first argument, the Federal Circuit noted that ICP could not 
prevail on a challenge of the administrative decision, anyway, because 
it “failed to file a protest of Customs’ actions and avail itself of 
jurisdiction under § 1581(a).”155  Secondly, the Federal Circuit found 
that § 1581(a) was an adequate remedy, and, even if it was not, 
jurisdiction under § 1581(h) would be the only remedy available to 
challenge the validity of Customs’ Notice of Action without requiring 
prior importation of goods.156  Finally, the Court rejected ICP’s 
challenge that the protest and review scheme contemplated by 
§ 1581(a) was unavailable because the company had not imported 
any product prior to, or after, the filing of its action.157  Because ICP 
did not attempt to import any shipments and then file a protest, the 
Federal Circuit found that ICP could not “manufacture jurisdiction 
under § 1581(i) by willfully avoiding the prerequisites of § 1581(a).”158
Samuel Aaron, Inc. v. United States159 involved the reliquidation of 
entries made by Samuel Aaron, Inc. (“Samuel Aaron”), an importer 
of jewelry from Thailand.160  Under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (“GSP”) program, certain imports from Thailand and 
other developing countries were eligible for a free rate of duty.161  
However, the GSP expired, and during the period of time before its 
reinstatement, Samuel Aaron imported and paid duties on its 
imports.162  While Congress granted retroactive refunds for certain 
items that had been imported during the lapse of the GSP, Samuel 
Aaron’s imports were found ineligible for the retroactive refunds 
provided for by statute.163  Customs determined that a reliquidation of 
all refunds was necessary for certain imports from Thailand, 
including Samuel Aaron’s entries.164  Customs placed a notice of 
liquidation in its “off-line bulletin” on February 8, 1999, at the 
 
 153. Int’l Custom Prods. v. United States (Int’l Custom Prods. II), 214 F. App’x 933, 
955 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 995–96. 
 156. Id. at 996. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. 508 F.3d 667 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 160. Id. at 667–70. 
 161. Id. at 668. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 669. 
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customhouse in the Port of New York.165  Customs later placed a 
bulletin notice created by its automated system on file on April 30, 
1999, to notify interested parties about the reliquidation of Samuel 
Aaron’s imports.166  However, Samuel Aaron did not file its protest to 
dispute the increased duties until July 29, 1999, more than ninety 
days after the date of reliquidation.167  Customs, therefore, denied 
Samuel Aaron’s protest as untimely.168  The CIT dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction, finding that a final computation of duties had occurred 
on February 8, 1999, the bulletin notice was legally sufficient, and 
thus there had been a valid reliquidation of Samuel Aaron’s entries 
on February 8, 1999.169
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that Samuel Aaron’s protest 
of Customs’ February 8, 1999 reliquidation was untimely, and that the 
CIT lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint.170  In particular, the 
Federal Circuit determined that Customs did, in fact, liquidate171 on 
February 8, 1999, in compliance with 19 C.F.R. § 159.1.172  Further, 
the Federal Circuit found that the reliquidation notice requirements 
were met by Customs’ off-line bulletin notice in the customhouse.173  
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1500(e), Customs must give notice of any 
liquidation to an importer as prescribed by regulation.174  The Federal 
Circuit determined that the notice was in a conspicuous place, in 
compliance with 19 C.F.R. § 159.9(b), and adequate as evaluated 
according to the standard of a prudent importer or other interested 
person exercising a reasonable amount of diligence.175  Furthermore, 
it found that Customs’ failure to file the notice on the correct form 
did not invalidate the filing, as the substance of the information 
provided in the off-line bulletin notice was sufficient to meet the 
requirements of 19 C.F.R. § 159.9(a).176  Finally, the Court concluded 
 
 165. See id. (explaining that the notice was considered “off-line” because it was not 
generated by the Customs’ automated system, which generates the vast majority of 
bulletin notices). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  The statutory limitations period for protests in 1999 was ninety days. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 674. 
 171. Liquidation is the “final computation or ascertainment of the duties . . . 
accruing on an entry.”  Id. at 670–71 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (2007)). 
 172. Id. at 670–72. 
 173. Id. at 674. 
 174. Id. at 672 (citation omitted). 
 175. See id. at 672–73 (citing the “conspicuous place” standard set forth in Frederick 
Wholesale Co. v. United States, 754 F.2d 349, 352 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 176. See id. at 673 (providing that all of the vital information was present on the 
form filed by Customs, and that “[f]ormality need not prevail over substance”). 
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that, while § 1500(e) gives Customs the option of notifying importers 
of liquidations electronically, it does not require it.177
The International Custom Products opinion is another in a long line 
of decisions circumscribing the CIT’s jurisdiction under the residual 
jurisdiction provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i).178  If there is an 
opportunity for the importer to obtain jurisdiction of the CIT by 
importing a good and protesting its classification, the courts will not 
find jurisdiction pursuant to that provision.179
Similarly, the Samuel Aaron decision is another in a long line of 
decisions emphasizing the importance of filing protests in a timely 
manner.180  Such decisions continue to support the necessity for 
importers to monitor Customs’ posting of bulletin notices of 
liquidation. 
D. Other Customs Issues 
Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. United States181 involved the authority of 
Customs to alter tariff rates for merchandise properly classified under 
the HTSUS.182  Forest Laboratories, Inc. (“Forest”) imported a 
pharmaceutical product, hydroxypropyl methylcellulose (“HPMC”).183  
Customs issued a ruling letter on March 17, 1999, in which Customs 
and Forest both agreed that the HPMC was properly classified under 
subheading 3912.39.00 of the HTSUS.184  However, while Forest stated 
that the duty rate was 4.2% ad valorem, Customs stated in its ruling 
letter that the HPMC was duty free as a pharmaceutical product.185  
“HPMC was listed in the Pharmaceutical Appendix until 1997 when it 
was removed by Presidential proclamation.”186  Forest acknowledged 
 
 177. See id. at 674 (reasoning that Customs is given the option to either give notice 
in a manner prescribed by the Secretary or to give notice electronically). 
 178. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (explaining that the Federal 
Circuit has found that the ICP cannot manufacture jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(i)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Samuel Aaron, 508 F.3d at 672. 
 181. 476 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 182. Id. at 878. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 879. 
 185. Id.  Customs cited General Note 13 of the HTSUS, which provides in part: 
Pharmaceutical Products.  Whenever a rate of duty of “Free” followed by the 
symbol “K” in parenthesis appears in the “Special” subcolumn for a heading 
or subheading, any product (by whatever name known) classifiable in such 
provision which is the product of a country eligible for tariff treatment under 
column 1 shall be entered free of duty, provided that such product is included in 
the pharmaceutical appendix to the tariff schedule. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 186. Id. 
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that HPMC is not listed in the Pharmaceutical Appendix to the tariff 
schedule and was not listed at the time it imported HPMC.187  
“Rather, Forest attempted to assert that Customs’ statement in [the 
ruling letter] that Forest’s HPMC qualified for duty free 
treatment . . . was binding on Customs and could not be revoked or 
modified without following the notice and comment requirements in 
19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).”188  Customs denied Forest’s duty assessment 
protest because HPMC was not listed in the Pharmaceutical 
Appendix as required by General Note 13 of the HTSUS, and 
therefore was not entitled to duty-free treatment.189
The central issue before the Federal Circuit was “whether Customs 
ha[d] the legal authority to change the HTSUS tariff duty for 
otherwise properly classified merchandise under HTSUS.”190  In its 
analysis, the Federal Circuit found that a requirement of General 
Note 13, which permits duty-free treatment of certain pharmaceutical 
products, was not met, as HPMC was not listed in the Pharmaceutical 
Appendix.191  Additionally, the Federal Circuit determined that 
Customs did not have the authority to change the duty rates set by 
Congress under the tariff statute, and therefore could not act outside 
of its statutory authority by permitting duty-free treatment through its 
issuance of N.Y. D88210.192  The HPMC was thus properly liquidated 
at the duty rate of 4.2% ad valorem as set forth in subheading 
3912.39.00 of the HTSUS.193   
In United States v. National Semiconductor Corp.,194 the Federal Circuit 
held that the CIT reached beyond the penalty provision § 1592(c)(4) 
in awarding compensatory interest, and thereby vacated and 
remanded the case to the court.195  The CIT awarded compensatory 
interest in the amount of $250,840.21 under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) and 
a penalty award in the amount of $10,000 under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1592(c)(4).196  This case arose out of National Semiconductor 
Corporation’s (“NSC”) discovery that it had undervalued certain 
integrated circuits, micro-assemblies, and parts thereof, resulting in 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 880. 
 190. Id. at 881–82. 
 191. See id. (concluding that because HPMC was not listed in the Pharmaceutical 
Appendix, the product was not eligible for duty-free treatment under General Note 
13). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. 496 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 195. Id. at 1355. 
 196. Id. at 1356. 
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two groups of erroneous customs entries.197  NSC voluntarily disclosed 
the errors and tendered the unpaid fees.198  Customs accepted the 
tender but determined that negligent violations of 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1592(a) allowed it to assess penalties.199  Customs assessed penalties 
in the amount of $250,840.21 for both negligent entries.200  NSC 
protested, stating that, while it had been negligent, it should not be 
assessed the maximum penalty because it had acted responsibly by 
voluntarily reporting the erroneous entries.201
NSC filed an action at the CIT, which considered the fourteen 
factors, set forth in United States v. Complex Machine Works Co.,202 that 
the CIT may consider when determining the appropriateness of a 
civil penalty for a violation of customs laws.203  The CIT concluded 
that the maximum allowable penalty under § 1592(c)(4) would not 
fully compensate the government.204  The CIT therefore determined 
that the government was entitled to an award of $10,000 as a penalty 
under § 1592(c)(4) and compensatory interest under § 1505(c).205
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, NSC argued that the CIT abused 
its discretion in awarding non-penal compensatory interest, arguing 
that the only recovery available to the government was the penalty of 
$10,000 that was awarded under § 1592(c)(4).206  The Federal Circuit 
held that the CIT erred in awarding compensatory interest to the 
government under § 1505(c).207  Under § 1592, where an importer’s 
violation is due to negligence and the importer voluntarily discloses 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. 23 Ct. Int’l Trade 942 (1999). 
 203. The Complex Machine Works analysis includes fourteen factors: 
(1) [T]he defendant’s good faith effort to comply with the statute; (2) the 
degree of culpability involved; (3) the defendant’s history of previous 
violations; (4) the nature of the public interest in ensuring compliance with 
the applicable law; (5) the nature and circumstances of the violation; (6) the 
gravity of the violation; (7) the defendant’s ability to pay; (8) the 
appropriateness of the size of the penalty vis-à-vis the defendant’s business 
and the effect of the penalty on the defendant’s ability to continue doing 
business; (9) the economic benefit gained by the defendant through the 
violation; (10) whether the party sought to be protected by the statute is 
elsewhere adequately compensated for the harm; (11) the degree of harm to 
the public; (12) the value of vindicating agency authority; (13) whether the 
penalty shocks the conscience of the court; and (14) such other matters as 
justice may require. 
Id. at 949–50. 
 204. National Semiconductor, 496 F.3d at 1357. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 1359. 
 207. Id. 
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the violation to Customs, the amount of the penalty cannot exceed 
the interest on the amount of lawful duties, taxes, and fees.208  This 
language unambiguously capped the amount the government may 
recover.  Nothing in the statutory language provides for recovery of 
non-penal compensatory interest in an action to collect an interest 
penalty pursuant to § 1592(c).209  Furthermore, § 1505 requires 
liquidation or reliquidation of an entry at a higher rate of duty, fee, 
or tax for the government to recover compensatory interest under 
§ 1505(c).210  In this case, it was undisputed that more than one year 
had passed from the date of NSC’s erroneous entries to the date 
when NSC notified Customs of the error.211  Therefore, the entries 
had already been liquidated and were final as a matter of law and 
there could be no accrual of interest on the unpaid merchandise 
processing fees.212  In light of this, the CIT’s award of compensatory 
interest under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) was in error.213  The Federal 
Circuit vacated the judgment of the CIT and remanded the case to 
the CIT to conduct a Complex Machine Works analysis solely under 
§ 1592(c)(4).214
In United States v. Ford Motor Co.,215 the Federal Circuit faced issues 
of waiver and issue preclusion.  The case was part of a long line of 
cases involving Ford Motor Company’s (“Ford”) alleged 
misrepresentations of motor vehicle engine and transmission import 
 
 208. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4)(B) (2000) provides: 
[I]f the person concerned discloses the circumstances of a violation of 
subsection (a) of this section before, or without knowledge of, the 
commencement of a formal investigation of such violation, with respect to 
such violation, merchandise shall not be seized and any monetary penalty to 
be assessed under subsection (c) of this section shall not exceed, if such 
violation resulted from negligence or gross negligence, the interest 
(computed from the date of liquidation at the prevailing rate of interest 
applied under section 6621 of Title 26) on the amount of lawful duties, 
taxes, and fees of which the United States is or may be deprived so long as 
such person tenders the unpaid amount of the lawful duties, taxes, and fees 
at the time of disclosure, or within 30 days (or such longer period as the 
Customs Service may provide) after notice by the Customs Service of its 
calculation of such unpaid amount. 
 209. Id. § 1592. 
 210. 19 U.S.C. §  1505(c) (2000). 
 211. National Semiconductor, 496 F.3d at 1361. 
 212. 19 C.F.R. § 159.11(a) (2007) (“Except as provided in § 159.12, an entry not 
liquidated within 1 year from the date of entry of the merchandise, or the date of 
final withdrawal of all merchandise covered by a warehouse entry, shall be deemed 
liquidated by operation of law.”). 
 213. National Semiconductor, 496 F.3d at 1361. 
 214. Id. 
 215. 497 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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entries.216  As a result of its incorrect designations, Customs found 
that Ford owed approximately $5.3 million in additional duties and 
referred Ford’s errors to its fraud investigation office.217  The 
government filed a § 1592 action against Ford at the CIT, seeking 
civil penalties for fraud, gross negligence, and negligence pursuant to 
§ 1592(c).218  The CIT dismissed those counts on the bases that the 
government failed to accept a waiver from Ford that waived the 
statute of limitations and issue preclusion,219 in light of its decision in 
the last Ford Motor Co. v. United States220 decision. 
The Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision to dismiss because 
the waiver was invalid, thereby allowing the statute of limitations to 
run on both claims for penalties and for duties.221  Ford asserted that 
Customs refused to accept its last waiver by striking the words “and 
accepted” from the waiver.222  However, the Federal Circuit found that 
a waiver is a “voluntary, unilateral waiver of a defense” that is not 
incumbent on the other party’s “acceptance.”223  Here, Ford’s letter 
stated that it “knowingly and voluntarily” “waive[d] the period of 
limitations . . . with respect to the eleven (11) Customs entries.”224  
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that its waiver was a voluntary act 
sufficient to extend the § 1621 statute of limitations period.225
The Federal Circuit also reversed the CIT on issue preclusion.  
Ford argued that the operative facts in both cases were essentially the 
same and thus concluded that the present case would involve 
relitigating those same issues.226  The Federal Circuit held that a prior 
proceeding where the government had not properly extended 
liquidation of entries and ordered refund of duties did not bar the 
government from pursuing civil penalties for fraud involving those 
same entries.227  The Federal Circuit further found that the holding in 
the last Ford decision was limited to the issue in that case—whether 
the government had properly extended the one-year liquidation 
 
 216. See id. at 1333–34 (describing how Ford incorrectly stated on forms that it was 
importing parts for assembled cars, rather than for assembled trucks, thus benefiting 
from an improperly low rate). 
 217. Id. at 1334. 
 218. Id. at 1335. 
 219. Id. at 1333. 
 220. 286 F.3d 1335, 1336–39 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 221. 497 F.3d at 1336–37. 
 222. Id. at 1336. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 1337. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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deadline pursuant to § 1504(b).228  Therefore, the court held that the 
CIT erred in dismissing the government’s claims based on issue 
preclusion grounds.229
Koyo Corp. of U.S.A. v. United States230 involved two issues, whether an 
importer can protest a deemed liquidation and what duty rate applies 
if the importer properly protests the deemed liquidation.  Koyo 
Corporation of U.S.A. (“Koyo”) made three entries of bearings 
subject to an antidumping order.231  All entries were deemed 
liquidated according to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) at the cash deposit rates 
in effect at the time of entry.232  However, Customs had made final 
assessment determinations at rates lower than the deposit rates.233  
Koyo protested the liquidation rates, contending that the final 
assessment rates should be applied.234
The Federal Circuit first found that the entries were deemed 
liquidated by operation of law pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).235  
However, it also determined that deemed liquidation did not take 
away the right of protest.236  The government, on the other hand, 
contended that deemed liquidation is inherently conclusive, final, 
and binding, cannot be protested by an importer, and that the rate of 
duty asserted at entry is the only duty rate that can be assessed.237  The 
Federal Circuit found that the purpose and legislative history of 19 
U.S.C. § 1504 supported the holding that Congress did not intend to 
remove the importer’s protest remedy.238  Thus, the court determined 
that the first two protests were timely filed.239  The third protest, 
however, presented a genuine issue of material fact, and the court 
remanded for further findings to determine whether it was timely 
filed.240  With regard to the applicable duty rate, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the duty rate should be that determined in the 
administrative and judicial reviews.241  While a deemed liquidation 
makes liquidation final, it does not determine the final duty rate 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1338. 
 230. 497 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 231. Id. at 1233. 
 232. Id. at 1234. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 1237. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 1238. 
 238. Id. at 1239. 
 239. Id. at 1240. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 1243. 
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imposed on the imported goods.242  Therefore, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the CIT’s decision to reliquidate the entries in the first two 
protests and remanded the entry in the third protest for further 
findings.243
In SKF USA, Inc. v. United States,244 the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded a CIT decision on the basis that deemed liquidation had 
made the case moot.245  The entries at issue were liquidated by 
operation of law before the trial court ruled on SKF USA’s (“SKF”) 
motion for preliminary injunction.246  The Federal Circuit applied the 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States247 rule, which renders a court action 
moot once liquidation occurs, stating “[o]nce liquidation occurs, a 
subsequent decision by the trial court on the merits of [a] challenge 
can have no effect on the dumping duties assessed.”248  Here, the 
Federal Circuit found that the entries at issue were deemed 
liquidated before the trial court ruled on the motion.249  Therefore, 
the case was moot as soon as the entries were deemed liquidated. 
II. TRADE REMEDY LAWS 
The United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and 
the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) are 
responsible for conducting antidumping and countervailing duty 
investigations.250  If Commerce determines that foreign goods are 
being sold at “less than fair value,” as calculated under a statutory 
formula,251 and if the ITC finds that such sales are injuring or 
threatening to injure a domestic industry, or that the establishment 
of a domestic industry is materially retarded, Commerce is required 
to issue an antidumping order imposing antidumping duties on the 
imported good.252  In a countervailing duty investigation, Commerce 
determines whether a government or public entity is providing the 
producer with a countervailable subsidy to aid in the manufacture, 
 
 242. Id. at 1241. 
 243. Id. at 1243. 
 244. 246 F. App’x 692 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 245. Id. at 698. 
 246. Id. at 693–94. 
 247. 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 248. SKF USA, 246 F. App’x at 695 (quoting Zenith, 710 F.2d at 810). 
 249. Id. at 694. 
 250. See United States International Trade Commission, Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Investigations and Reviews, http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy 
/731_ad_701_cvd/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (describing Commerce and 
ITC responsibilities under Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930). 
 251. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (2000). 
 252. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a) (2000). 
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export, or production of a product, and, in most cases, the ITC also 
makes an injury determination.253
A. United States Department of Commerce 
There were sixteen cases in 2007 involving appeals from 
Commerce determinations.  The trade remedy cases involving 
Commerce covered a wide variety of issues, including scope rulings, 
duty absorption, and statutory interpretation. 
In Mukand International, Ltd. v. United States,254 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the CIT’s determination denying Mukand International’s 
(“Mukand”) reliquidation and refund claim.  That case involved the 
2001–02 administrative review of Mukand’s entries of stainless steel 
bar produced in the United Arab Emirates out of stainless steel wire 
rod from India, with Commerce issuing its results determining a final 
antidumping duty rate on August 11, 2003.255  Commerce then 
provided notice that Customs would be instructed to liquidate those 
entries at the determined rate.256  Mukand did not participate in the 
review; however, it submitted a scope ruling application on May 14, 
2003, while the administrative review was pending, seeking a 
determination of whether its imports fell within the scope of the 
antidumping order.257  Commerce did not take any immediate action 
on that application.258  More than a year later, Mukand filed an action 
in the CIT seeking a writ of mandamus requiring Commerce to issue 
a scope determination, suspend further liquidation, reliquidate 
entries of stainless steel bar produced in the United Arab Emirates, 
and refund all of Mukand’s antidumping duties on those entries.259
The CIT ruled that, because Mukand failed to take timely action to 
prevent its entries from being liquidated and did not diligently 
pursue its injunctive remedies, it was not entitled to the requested 
relief.260  On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that, while the CIT had 
 
 253. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(1) (2000). 
 254. 502 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 255. See Antidumping Duty Order:  Stainless Steel Bar from Brazil, India and 
Japan, 60 Fed. Reg. 9661 (Feb. 21, 1995) (revealing the underlying antidumping duty 
order). 
 256. Mukand, 502 F.3d at 1367. 
 257. Id. at 1368.  Within forty-five days of receiving a scope ruling application, 
Commerce must either issue a final ruling on the matter or initiate a “scope inquiry.”  
19 C.F.R. § 351.225(c)(2) (2008).  If Commerce chooses to initiate a scope inquiry, 
and if liquidation of the entry in question has already been suspended, the 
suspension of liquidation will continue for the duration of the scope inquiry.  Id. 
§ 351.225(l). 
 258. Mukand, 502 F.3d at 1368. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 1369. 
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jurisdiction to hear the merits of the mandamus petition, Mukand 
was not entitled to mandamus because it failed to take advantage of 
adequate alternative remedies available to it at the time.261  
“Moreover, at any time before its entries were liquidated and after the 
forty-fifth day following the submission of its completed scope ruling 
application, Mukand could have filed a mandamus action to compel 
Commerce to institute a scope inquiry and order the continued 
suspension under 19 C.F.R. § 351.225.”262  The Federal Circuit also 
found that Timken Co. v. United States263 and Shinyei Corp. of America v. 
United States264 are both inapposite and would not have barred 
Mukand from seeking a writ of mandamus forty-five days after it filed 
its scope ruling application.265  Therefore, the Federal Circuit upheld 
the CIT’s order dismissing the action. 
In Parkdale International v. United States,266 Parkdale International 
(“Parkdale”) appealed the CIT determination that Commerce’s 
application of its “Reseller Policy” did not have an impermissibly 
retroactive effect.267  Parkdale was a reseller, importer, and exporter 
of corrosion-resistant carbon steel products (“CORE”) between 
Canada and the United States.268  Parkdale chose not to participate in 
the administrative review for the period of review (“POR”) between 
August 1, 2002, and July 31, 2003.269  Parkdale challenged the 
preliminary results as an interested party, but Commerce rejected its 
challenge and issued final results in March 2005.270  In its final results, 
Commerce stated that its May 6, 2003, Reseller Policy would apply to 
unreviewed resellers, like Parkdale, who purchased their CORE from 
a reviewed producer who did not know its goods were destined for 
the United States.271  As a result, Parkdale’s subject goods entered 
during the POR would be liquidated at the “all-others” rate, which 
was considerably higher than exporter-specific rates in this case.272  
The Reseller Policy was initially proposed in 1998 and provided that, 
 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. 893 F.2d 337 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that the alternative remedy of an 
injunction was not adequate, thus the third element of a mandamus action, the lack 
of an adequate alternative remedy, was met). 
 264. 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the CIT can still grant relief 
after liquidation). 
 265. Mukand, 502 F.3d at 1369–70. 
 266. 475 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 267. Id. at 1378. 
 268. Id. at 1376. 
 269. Id. at 1377. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
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if Commerce determines that the producer did not know that the 
merchandise it sold to the reseller was destined for the United States, 
the reseller’s merchandise would be liquidated at the all-others 
rate.273
Commerce acknowledged that the Reseller Policy gave rise to 
relatively significant change for affected parties.274  Parkdale claimed 
that Canadian resellers had every reason to believe, at the time of 
importation, that their imports were subject to existing practice, not 
the all-others rate.275  Commerce nonetheless adopted the policy, and 
Parkdale filed suit in the CIT, arguing that the application of the 
Reseller Policy had an impermissibly retroactive effect.276  The CIT 
denied its challenge, and Parkdale appealed. 
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit relayed that, to determine 
whether the application of a law or policy is impermissibly retroactive, 
it must examine the “‘nature and extent of the change of the law,’ 
‘the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and 
a relevant past event,’ and ‘considerations of fair notice, reasonable 
reliance, and settled expectations.’”277  While the government 
conceded that the policy was a significant change, the Federal Circuit 
found that the other two factors weighed heavily in favor of the 
government.278  The Federal Circuit noted that there was not a 
“significant retroactive connection with past events,” since the degree 
of connection between the policy and Parkdale’s subject entries was 
minimal.279  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit concluded that there 
was adequate notice to Parkdale, especially in light of the Federal 
Circuit’s recent holdings that liquidation of entries is the operative 
event for deciding whether application of a statute or regulation is 
impermissibly retroactive.280  Parkdale could not have had an 
objectively reasonable settled expectation of what its duty rate would 
be until liquidation.281  Moreover, since 1998, Parkdale was on notice 
 
 273. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings:  Assessment of 
Antidumping Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. 55,361 (Oct. 15, 1998). 
 274. Parkdale, 475 F.3d at 1378. 
 275. Id. at 1379. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 1378–79 (quoting Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 1358, 
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 278. Id. at 1380. 
 279. Id. at 1379 (quoting Princess Cruises, 397 F.3d at 1366). 
 280. See, e.g., Travenol Labs., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 749, 753 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (holding that liquidation is the operative event because liquidation defines the 
basis upon which interest may be due by deciding whether there has been an 
overpayment or an underpayment).   
 281. Parkdale, 475 F.3d at 1380. 
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that Commerce might adopt the Reseller Policy.282  Therefore, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination.283
In Viraj Group v. United States,284 the Federal Circuit reversed the 
CIT’s decision that held that Commerce incorrectly applied the 
collapsing regulation to the Viraj Group (“Viraj”).285  In that case, 
Commerce conducted an antidumping duty investigation of stainless 
steel bar imports from India.286  Certain regulations allow Commerce, 
as part of its investigation, to treat affiliated companies as though 
they were one entity.287  Viraj’s appeal concerned whether Viraj met 
each of the requirements in the collapsing regulation, such that 
Commerce should have treated Viraj as one group in its 
administrative review for the 2000–01 POR.288  The relevant Viraj 
companies during the 2000–01 POR were:  (1) Viraj Impoexpo, Ltd. 
(“VIL”); (2) Viraj Alloys, Ltd. (“VAL”); and (3) Viraj Forgings, Ltd. 
(“VFL”).289
In 2002, Commerce made a final determination that the Viraj 
Group should be collapsed (i.e., treated as a single entity) for 
calculating its dumping margin.290  On appeal, the CIT found that 
Commerce’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and 
remanded to Commerce to reanalyze the collapsing decision and 
revise its dumping margin calculation if necessary.291  Commerce 
reconsidered its collapsing analysis and found that collapsing was 
permissible under the statute because VAL could produce equivalent 
products to VIL without substantial retooling.292  The CIT remanded 
Commerce’s determinations twice, each time finding that 
Commerce’s decision to collapse the Viraj Group was incorrect.293  
 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. 476 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 285. Id. at 1359. 
 286. Id. at 1351–52; see Antidumping Duty Order:  Stainless Steel Bar from Brazil, 
India, and Japan, 60 Fed. Reg. 9661 (Feb. 21, 1995) (specifying the antidumping 
duty orders on stainless-steel bar imported from Brazil, India, and Japan). 
 287. For example, one regulation provides: 
In an antidumping proceeding under this part, the Secretary will treat two or 
more affiliated producers as a single entity where those producers have 
production facilities for similar or identical products that would not require 
substantial retooling of either facility in order to restructure manufacturing 
priorities and the Secretary concludes that there is a significant potential for 
the manipulation of price or production. 
19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(1) (2007). 
 288. Viraj, 476 F.3d at 1351–54. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 1352. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 1351–54. 
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Commerce complied with the CIT’s instructions to calculate separate 
dumping margins for VAL and VIL/VFL.294  The CIT affirmed 
Commerce’s separate dumping margin calculation.295  Viraj 
challenged that decision in an appeal to the Federal Circuit.296
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the Viraj Group 
satisfied all the requirements set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(1) to 
collapse the company.297  The court found that the second prong—
that the companies must have “production facilities for similar or 
identical products that would not require substantial retooling of 
either facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities”—was 
ambiguous on its face because the word “either” was unclear.298  The 
CIT stated that the regulation required Commerce to “examine the 
production facilities of both (or all) companies and evaluate the 
possibility that production may be shifted from one company to 
another and vice versa.”299  Commerce, on the other hand, believed 
that it was sufficient if any one company could shift production to 
another, without substantial retooling.300  The Federal Circuit found 
that Commerce’s definition was more consistent with the purpose of 
the regulation because it allowed Commerce to collapse companies 
where manipulation could occur in any one direction.301  
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit found that the collapsing 
regulation only required similarity among the products produced, 
not among the facilities that produced them.302  The CIT had stated 
that the production facilities had to be similar.303
Lastly, the Federal Circuit addressed the application of the major 
input rule in deciding whether to collapse affiliated companies.304  
“The major input rule, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(3), provides 
Commerce discretion in valuing one company’s production input, 
when the company receives that input from an affiliated company at 
a price less than the cost of production for the input.”305  The CIT 
stated that because VIL/VFL purchases an important material input 
from its affiliate VAL, application of this rule would accentuate 
 
 294. Id. at 1354. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 1355. 
 298. Id. at 1355–56. 
 299. Id. at 1355. 
 300. Id. at 1355–56. 
 301. Id. at 1356. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
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“potential misstatements” in costs that would arise if Viraj Group were 
treated as one entity.306  The Federal Circuit found that Congress 
made a delegation on this issue to the agency, pursuant to Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.307  Further, 
Commerce’s practice in implementing the major input rule was 
found to be reasonable.308  The Federal Circuit noted that its decision 
was not dictated by AK Steel Corp. v. United States309 because AK Steel 
dealt with the application of the major input rule once it had 
properly determined that companies should be collapsed.310  Here, 
the Federal Circuit was considering application when deciding 
whether to collapse affiliated entities.311  However, the conclusion was 
the same—“Commerce’s practice, to either treat affiliated companies 
as one or to consider transactions among the companies under the 
fair value and major input rules, is reasonable.”312  Therefore, the 
Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision on the collapsing 
regulation, reinstating Commerce’s original determination.313
In yet another Federal Circuit case involving the same issue, 
Carpenter Technology Corp. v. United States,314 the Federal Circuit upheld 
Commerce’s decision to collapse the three companies within the 
Viraj Group for the purpose of calculating antidumping duties.315  
This case involved the same issue but an antidumping duty order 
involving a different product—stainless steel wire rod (“SSWR”) from 
India.316  The same three Viraj entities were at issue:  VAL, VFL, and 
VIL.317  In its analysis of the collapsing regulation, the Federal Circuit 
determined that only two prongs were involved—the substantial 
retooling of production facilities and the significant potential for 
manipulation.318  The Federal Circuit first found that the Viraj Group 
satisfied the substantial retooling of production facilities prong of the 
collapsing entity analysis.319  The Viraj entities all utilized the same 
facility to make SSWR from steel billets since they used the same 
 
 306. Id. at 1357. 
 307. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 308. Viraj, 476 F.3d at 1358. 
 309. 226 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 310. Viraj, 476 F.3d at 1358. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. 510 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 315. Id. at 1371. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 1373. 
 319. Id. at 1373–74. 
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subcontractor.320  The Federal Circuit also found that no retooling 
would be required since they all utilized the same facilities.321  
Second, the Federal Circuit determined that there was significant 
potential for manipulation.322  It took into consideration that 
Commerce had found all three companies had the same two 
directors, that those directors effectively controlled all three 
companies, that those directors and their relatives were the principal 
stockholders, and that their operations were substantially 
intertwined.323  Thus, the factual findings on these two issues 
demonstrated that Commerce’s determination was supported by 
substantial evidence.324
In NSK Ltd. v. United States,325 the Federal Circuit upheld the CIT’s 
determination sustaining Commerce’s use of “facts otherwise 
available” and “adverse inferences” when determining the four 
appellants’ (collectively known as “NTN”) antidumping margin.326  
This case involved the twelfth administrative review of an 
antidumping order covering certain antifriction bearings imported 
from Japan.327  As part of the review, Commerce allowed NTN to 
allocate its freight expenses, if necessary, according to the basis on 
which the expenses were incurred, such as weight or volume.328  If 
NTN was unable to allocate its freight expenses according to the 
bases on which they were incurred, “Commerce required NTN to 
(1) explain how it allocated the expenses, (2) explain why it could 
not allocate them on the bases on which they were incurred, and 
(3) demonstrate that the allocation method that NTN selected in its 
response was not distortive.”329  NTN chose to allocate its freight 
expenses according to sales value.330  In response to Commerce’s 
requests for further information, NTN asserted that its allocation was 
not distortive because it based freight expenses on the factor 
common to each shipment—sales value—but the firm did not 
provide the supporting data requested by Commerce.331  Commerce 
rejected NTN’s allocation methodology and determined freight 
 
 320. Id. at 1373. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 1374. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. 481 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 326. Id. at 1361. 
 327. Id. at 1357. 
 328. Id. at 1358. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
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expenses by “drawing adverse inferences” from “facts otherwise 
available,” pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e.332
The Federal Circuit determined that NTN failed to justify 
allocating expenses on a basis not used in incurring them.333  The 
relevant regulation specifically requires that the respondent 
demonstrate that the proposed method did not cause inaccuracies or 
distortions and that the respondent has allocated its expenses on as 
specific a basis as is feasible.334  NTN failed to demonstrate that 
allocation by sales value is not distortive or inaccurate, only offering 
conclusory assertions without full explanations.335  Also, NTN did not 
provide any evidence to support its assertion that allocation by sales 
value was as specific as feasible.336
In Crawfish Processors Alliance v. United States,337 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a CIT decision sustaining a scope ruling by Commerce that 
crawfish etouffee is not included within the scope of an antidumping 
duty order covering freshwater crawfish tail meat.338  On June 4, 2004, 
Coastal Foods, LLC (“Coastal”), requested a scope ruling from 
Commerce to determine whether the antidumping duty order339 
included crawfish etouffee within its scope.340  Commerce, pursuant 
to its regulations, under § 351.225(k)(1), had considered the 
language of the order but found that the language did not resolve 
the inquiry.341  In particular, Commerce evaluated the different 
interpretations of what constitutes “preserved” or “prepared” and 
whether the tail meat had been transformed into another product.342  
Accordingly, Commerce weighed the additional Diversified Products 
Corp. v. United States343 factors as set forth in § 351.225(k)(2)344 to find 
 
 332. Id. at 1359. 
 333. Id. at 1359–60. 
 334. 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g) (2007). 
 335. NSK, 481 F.3d at 1360. 
 336. Id. 
 337. 483 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 338. Id. at 1359. 
 339. Antidumping Duty Order:  Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat From the People’s 
Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,218 (Sept. 15, 1997). 
 340. Crawfish Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1359–60. 
 341. Id. at 1360; cf. Antidumping Duty Order:  Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat 
From the People’s Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. at 48,219 (describing the issue as 
concerning “freshwater crawfish tail meat, in all its forms (whether washed or with fat 
on, whether purged or unpurged), grades, and sizes; whether frozen, fresh, or 
chilled; and regardless of how it is packed, preserved, or prepared”). 
 342. Crawfish Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1360. 
 343. 6 Ct. Int’l Trade 155 (1983). 
 344. Those factors include the physical characteristics of the product, the 
expectations of the ultimate purchasers, the ultimate use of the product, the 
channels of trade in which the product is sold, and the manner in which the product 
 1180 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1145 
                                                
that the etouffee had undergone substantial transformation into a 
new and different product beyond the crawfish tail meat covered by 
the order.345  The CIT agreed with and sustained Commerce’s scope 
ruling. 
Despite Crawfish Processors Alliance’s (“CPA”) arguments to the 
contrary, the Federal Circuit found that the language of the scope 
order was not dispositive to determine whether etouffee is included 
within the order and that Commerce had properly considered the 
Diversified Products factors.346  The court noted that the ingredients 
had penetrated the tail meat and permanently altered its original 
flavor, evidence of a substantial transformation.347  The Federal 
Circuit also addressed CPA’s reliance on Orlando Food v. United States348 
in its argument that the addition of other ingredients did not 
fundamentally change the underlying product.349  Orlando Food was 
factually distinguishable because the mere addition of seasonings to 
whole tomatoes in that case did not alter the essential tomato 
character of the product.350  Therefore, the Federal Circuit upheld 
the CIT’s decision that etouffee is not included within the scope of 
the antidumping duty order.351
In another case involving the CPA, Crawfish Processors Alliance v. 
United States,352 the Federal Circuit addressed whether a transfer of 
cash or assets was required to prove affiliation.353  In that matter, 
Commerce had determined that Fujian Pelagic Fishery Group Co. 
(“Fujian”) and Pacific Coast Fisheries Corp. (“Pacific Coast”), two 
companies that initiated a civil action to contest Commerce’s 
antidumping decision, were not affiliated.354  However, the record 
showed that Fujian owned and exercised a sufficient amount of 
Pacific Coast’s public shares—more than five percent—during the 
POR.355
This was an issue of statutory interpretation for the Federal 
Circuit.356  Affiliated parties are defined in the statute as “[a]ny 
 
is advertised and displayed.  19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) (2007), cited in Crawfish 
Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1360. 
 345. Crawfish Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1361. 
 346. Id. at 1362–63. 
 347. Id. at 1363. 
 348. 140 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 349. Crawfish Processors Alliance, 483 F.3d at 1363. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 1364. 
 352. 477 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 353. Id. at 1384. 
 354. Id. at 1378. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 1379. 
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person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with 
power to vote, [five] percent or more of the outstanding voting stock 
or shares of any organization and such organization.”357  The Federal 
Circuit held that the statute clarified that owning, controlling or 
holding “directly or indirectly” over five percent of an entity’s stock 
constitutes “affiliation.”358  The plain language of the statute did not 
require the transfer of cash or merchandise to show ownership of five 
percent or more of the shares as Commerce had interpreted.359  Here, 
under the law of the State of Washington where Pacific Coast issued 
the stock to Fujian, a promissory note to purchase stock or shares of a 
corporation constituted sufficient proof.360  The Federal Circuit 
further found no reason to apply Chevron deference to Commerce’s 
interpretation in this case.361  Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that 
the companies were, in fact, affiliated, and reversed the CIT’s 
determination that 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33)(E) requires proof of full 
payment in cash or merchandise during the POR.362
Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States363 involved issues of statutory 
construction and agency deference.364  In this case, the Federal 
Circuit reversed the CIT and held that Commerce’s interpretation of 
“United States import duties” under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) was 
reasonable.365  Here, § 201 safeguard duties were in effect during the 
POR.366  According to 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A), Commerce is 
required to decrease an exporter’s export price by the amount of 
“any additional costs, charges, or expenses, and United States import 
duties, which are incident to bringing the subject merchandise from 
the original place of shipment in the exporting country to the place 
of delivery in the United States.”367  Commerce had previously never 
ruled on this issue, but found here that § 201 safeguards were not 
deductible from the export price in calculating the antidumping 
margin.368
Wheatland Tube, the domestic producer, contested Commerce’s 
treatment of § 201 safeguard duties, arguing that they qualified as 
 
 357. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33)(E) (2000). 
 358.  Crawfish Processors Alliance, 477 F.3d at 1380. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at 1381. 
 361. See id. at 1380 (observing that Chevron deference is not necessary where an 
agency’s interpretation is put forth in the midst of litigation). 
 362. Id. at 1382. 
 363. 495 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 364. Id. at 1357. 
 365. Id. 
 366. See id. (referring to duties imposed under 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000)). 
 367. Id. at 1358 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (2000)) (emphasis added). 
 368. Id. 
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“United States import duties”369 and therefore should be deducted 
from the export price.370  The CIT agreed with Wheatland Tube, 
stating that the effect of Commerce not including safeguard duties 
was to improperly negate the § 201 duty imposed by the President, 
artificially decrease Respondent’s antidumping margin, and upset the 
balance between § 201 and antidumping duties.371
The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether § 201 duties are 
“United States import duties” that can be deducted from the export 
price in determining an antidumping margin.372  The case was 
essentially one of statutory interpretation of § 1677a(c)(2)(A).373  The 
Federal Circuit conducted a Chevron analysis to determine whether 
Commerce’s statutory interpretation was entitled to deference.374
In this case, the Federal Circuit found that Congress had not 
defined or explained the meaning of “United States import duties,” 
and therefore proceeded to step two of the Chevron analysis.375  In 
United States v. Mead,376 the Supreme Court held that an agency’s 
statutory interpretation qualifies for Chevron deference if the 
interpretation is the result of the agency’s formal notice-and-
comment rulemaking process.377  Here, Commerce posted notice 
requesting comments on the treatment of § 201 duties, and at the 
completion of the formal notice-and-comment period, it filed its final 
ruling that § 201 safeguard duties are not United States import duties 
for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) and therefore should not 
be deducted from the export price in calculating dumping margin.378  
Because this ruling was the result of Commerce’s formal notice-and-
 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 1359 (citing Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 2d 
1271, 1283 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006)). 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. A Chevron analysis requires the court to address two questions.  Id.  “The first 
step of Chevron is to determine ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.’”  Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).  Under the second step of Chevron, “if Congress 
expressly or implicitly delegated authority to an agency to interpret a statute by 
authorizing the agency to issue substantive rules or regulations, [the] court must give 
deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute as promulgated in the rules or 
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Chevron applies only where “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue.”  Id. at 1359 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). 
 375. Id. at 1359–60. 
 376. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 377. Id. at 226–27. 
 378. Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1358. 
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comment rulemaking process, under step two of Chevron the court 
was obliged to “defer to [the] agency’s reasonable interpretation of a 
statute and [could] not substitute its own judgment for that of the 
agency even if the court might have preferred another interpretation 
and even if the agency’s interpretation is not the only reasonable 
one.”379  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted that it usually gives 
Commerce’s interpretation of antidumping laws significant deference 
because of its expertise in administering the antidumping duty laws.380
In reaching its determination that the interpretation of “United 
States import duties” was reasonable, the Federal Circuit first 
considered that the legislative history distinguished normal customs 
duties from “special dumping duties.”381  The court found that § 201 
duties were more like antidumping duties than normal customs 
duties because they were remedial relief from the adverse effects of 
imports.382  Further, if § 201 duties were included as “United States 
import duties,” Commerce would improperly collect § 201 safeguard 
duties twice.383  Therefore, the Federal Circuit determined that 
Commerce’s interpretation that “United States import duties” does 
not include § 201 safeguard duties for the purposes of determining 
the export price and calculating the dumping margin was 
reasonable.384
In Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Committee v. United States,385 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a CIT decision finding that Commerce’s 
determination that two respondents had de minimis dumping margins 
and should be excluded from the antidumping order was supported 
by substantial evidence.386  The appellant in the case challenged 
Commerce’s methodology in applying “facts otherwise available” to 
the factors of production.387
The Federal Circuit found that Commerce’s decision to apply facts 
otherwise available was supported by substantial evidence.388  The 
court stated that “the application of adverse inferences is not 
intended to be punitive; rather, Congress ‘intended for an adverse 
 
 379. Id. at 1360–61 (citing Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994); PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991)). 
 380. Id. at 1361 (citing Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298 F.3d 
1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Koyo Seiko, 36 F.3d at 1750). 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. at 1362. 
 384. Id. at 1363. 
 385. 232 F. App’x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 386. Id. at 967. 
 387. Id. at 968 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (2000)). 
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facts available rate to be a reasonably accurate estimate of the 
respondent’s actual rate, albeit with some built-in increase intended 
as a deterrent to non-compliance.’”389 The Federal Circuit found that 
Commerce had complied with that standard in determining that its 
findings of the factors of production were “adverse” within the 
meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e.390  In concluding that substantial 
evidence supported Commerce’s determinations, the court noted the 
broad discretion granted to the agency in valuing factors of 
production, as well as the thoroughness of Commerce’s investigation 
and reasonableness of the methodologies employed.391
In Corus Staal BV v. United States (Corus Staal II),392 the Federal 
Circuit upheld Commerce’s use of zeroing and classification of the 
disputed sales transactions, as well as its finding that Corus Staal BV 
(“Corus”) had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with 
regard to its absorption claim.393  Corus argued that Commerce’s 
announcement, in light of WTO determinations, that it would 
abandon the use of zeroing methodology394 in average-to-average 
comparisons to calculate weighted average dumping margins in 
antidumping investigations, demonstrated that Commerce has 
abandoned its policy of zeroing,395 which the Federal Circuit had 
previously held was a permissible interpretation of the statutory 
provisions.396  However, the Federal Circuit found that Commerce’s 
statements did not change with respect to retroactive application of 
the zeroing methodology.397  Commerce intended to apply its new 
 
 389. Id. at 969 (quoting F. Lii De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United 
States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 969–70. 
 392. 502 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 393. Id. at 1372. 
 394. According to the court: 
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policy only prospectively.398  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted 
that it accords Commerce substantial deference in its administration 
of the antidumping statute.399  In this case, Commerce made it clear 
that those changes do not apply retroactively to administrative 
reviews.400
Second, the Federal Circuit determined that certain sales to an 
unaffiliated U.S. customer were properly classified as constructed 
export price (“CEP”) rather than export price (“EP”) transactions.401  
Commerce found, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that the final 
sales occurred after the date of importation.402
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination that Corus 
had not exhausted its administrative remedies on the duty absorption 
claim, finding that the “futility exception” Corus raised did not 
apply.403  The futility exception applied only in situations in which 
enforcing the exhaustion requirement would mean that parties 
“would be ‘required to go through obviously useless motions in order 
to preserve their rights.’”404  The Federal Circuit thus found that the 
policies requiring exhaustion stated that, absent a strong contrary 
reason, the court should insist that parties exhaust their remedies 
before the pertinent administrative agencies.405
The Federal Circuit addressed zeroing again in NSK Ltd. v. United 
States.406  There, NSK, NTN Corporation (“NTN”), and Koyo appealed 
Commerce’s application of zeroing in its weighted-average dumping 
margin calculations.407  The court reiterated the determination it 
made in Corus Staal I,408 stating that it would not overturn 
Commerce’s zeroing practice based on any ruling by the WTO until 
such ruling had been adopted pursuant to a specific statutory 
scheme.409
 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. at 1375; accord Corus Staal I, 395 F.3d at 1349. 
 400. Corus Staal II, 502 F.3d at 1375. 
 401. Id. at 1375–76. 
 402. Id. at 1376. 
 403. Id. at 1378–81. 
 404. Id. at 1379 (quoting Bendure v. United States, 554 F.2d 427, 431 (Ct. Cl. 
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 405. Id. at 1379; see 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (2000) (“[T]he Court of International 
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 406. 510 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 407. Id. at 1378. 
 408. Corus Staal BV v. Dep’t of Commerce (Corus Staal I), 395 F.3d 1343, 1349 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 409. NSK, 510 F.3d at 1380. 
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The second issue in NSK involved Koyo’s billing adjustment 
allocations, which Commerce found to be distortive.410  While 
Commerce had previously accepted similar data in a past review, it 
determined that Koyo had not satisfied its burden of demonstrating 
that methodology was non-distortive in the instant review.411  The 
Federal Circuit agreed, finding that Commerce’s determination was 
supported by substantial evidence.412
Third, the Federal Circuit held that Commerce’s decision to 
include small-volume, high-profit home market sales in its value 
calculations was supported by substantial evidence.413  NTN argued 
that inclusion of these sales was distortive.414  However, this was 
contradicted by its submissions before the CIT, wherein it stated that 
these sales were made fairly regularly in the general course of 
business.415  Lastly, the Federal Circuit determined that NSK’s 
challenge to Commerce’s model-match methodology was not ripe for 
review because the policy had not been adopted yet.416  Commerce 
had merely issued a memorandum indicating that it considered 
changing the model-match approach it used for antidumping orders; 
however, it had not abandoned its previous methodology and 
adopted a new one.417  Commerce had further stated that it would 
offer a notice and comment period on the proposed change.418  
Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s dismissal of NSK’s 
challenge.419
The issues in Eurodif S.A. v. United States420 were also dismissed by 
the Federal Circuit as being unripe because they concerned 
application to future entries of the subject merchandise.421  This case 
concerned future entries of low enriched uranium (“LEU”) that were 
to be made pursuant to separate work unit (“SWU”) contracts made 
by Eurodif, S.A. (“Eurodif”).422  In previous litigation, the Federal 
Circuit held that SWU contracts were not subject to the antidumping 
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 411. Id. 
 412. Id. at 1382. 
 413. Id. at 1384. 
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statute because they were contracts for the sale of services.423  Eurodif 
argued that Commerce should be permitted to suspend liquidation 
of future LEU imports until it determines whether the SWU contract 
exception applies.424  However, the CIT held that the proper manner 
in which to address whether merchandise is within the scope of an 
order is through a scope determination.425  That determination would 
be reviewable by the CIT.  Furthermore, the issue was a speculative 
one—“what may or may not happen in the next LEU case, a case 
about which there were no facts.”426  Therefore, since there was an 
adequate administrative remedy, the case was dismissed as being 
unripe.427
Magnola Metallurgy, Inc. v. United States,428 involved a new shipper 
review of a countervailing duty order concerning alloy magnesium.429  
Magnola Metallurgy, Inc. (“Magnola”) was found to have received 
reimbursements from the government of Quebec through its 
Manpower Training Measure program (“MTM program”), which was 
designed to improve and develop Quebec’s labor market.430  In its 
review, Commerce determined that Magnola’s 1998 and 2000 MTM 
program reimbursements were non-recurring subsidies as defined in 
19 C.F.R. § 351.524(c), for which the benefits extended beyond the 
period that the subsidy was conferred.431  As such, it decided to 
amortize those benefits over a fourteen-year period pursuant to 19 
C.F.R. § 351.524(d)(2)(i).432
The Federal Circuit first addressed the issue of whether Commerce 
was required to make a de novo finding of specificity in its 2003 
administrative review.433  Absent new facts or evidence, however, the 
specificity determination made in the new shipper review remained.434  
The Federal Circuit noted that the statutory language on which 
Magnola relied was ambiguous.435  The Federal Circuit has previously 
 
 423. See Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); Eurodif 
S.A. v. United States, 411 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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(a)(1)(2000)).
 1188 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1145 
                                                
held that statutory interpretations articulated by Commerce during 
adjudicatory proceedings are entitled to Chevron deference.436  Here, 
nothing convinced the court that Commerce’s interpretation of the 
statute was unreasonable, and, thus, the Federal Circuit deferred to 
Commerce’s interpretation.437  The Federal Circuit also found that 
Magnola’s argument that it had new evidence requiring Commerce 
to revisit its original determination was irrelevant because this simply 
dealt with the amortization of the subsidy.438   
Additionally, the Federal Circuit concluded that it did not have to 
reexamine whether the specificity determination made in the new 
shipper review was clearly erroneous and should be reexamined.439  
The Federal Circuit found that the Supreme Court case Interstate 
Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers440 directly 
addressed this issue.441  There, the court denied judicial review of an 
agency’s refusal to reconsider on the ground of material error.442  In 
other cases, the Court has held that an agency’s refusal to reopen a 
closed case is an issue committed to agency discretion.443  The Federal 
Circuit therefore held that Commerce was not required to determine 
whether it should reconsider its earlier specificity determination 
based on alleged error in the original decision.444
In Agro Dutch Industries Ltd. v. United States,445 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the CIT’s decision to affirm Commerce’s interpretation of 
the term “affiliation” in 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) and its affirmative 
finding of duty absorption.446  The antidumping statute allows 
Commerce, in the second or fourth administrative reviews, to 
determine whether antidumping duties have been absorbed by a 
foreign producer or exporter if the subject merchandise is sold in the 
United States through an importer who is affiliated with such foreign 
producer or exporter.447  Commerce conducted a duty absorption 
analysis of Agro Dutch Industries, Ltd. (“Agro”) and found that 
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 441. Magnola, 508 F.3d at 1357. 
 442. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. at 280. 
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antidumping duties had been absorbed by Agro instead of being 
passed on to customers.448
Agro appealed with the sole contention that Commerce could not 
properly conduct a duty absorption analysis because Agro did not sell 
its merchandise “in the United States through an importer who is 
affiliated” with Agro, as required by § 1675(a)(4).449  However, before 
reaching the merits, the Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that, 
although Agro failed to raise the argument that formed the basis for 
the appeal during the Commerce proceedings, the court could 
address Agro’s argument on appeal because it implicated a pure 
question of law.450  The Federal Circuit held that the application of 
exhaustion principles is generally subject to the discretion of the 
CIT.451  The CIT had previously articulated a “pure question of law” 
exception to the exhaustion requirement in trade cases.452  The 
Federal Circuit determined that the CIT had not abused its discretion 
in the instant case.453
In reaching the merits, the Federal Circuit conducted a Chevron 
statutory analysis.454  Here, the dispute focused on whether the phrase 
“through an importer who is affiliated with such foreign producer or 
exporter”455 encompassed Agro.456  The Federal Circuit first found 
that the meaning of the term “affiliated” required two parties.457  
Furthermore, it found that that interpretation of the term should be 
consistent with its use elsewhere in the antidumping laws.458  In this 
case, it was undisputed that Agro was acting as its own importer of 
record.459  Thus, according to the unambiguous meaning of the 
statutory terms, a company cannot be an “affiliate” with itself, and the 
 
 448. Agro, 508 F.3d at 1026–27.
 449. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) (2000); Agro, 508 F.3d at 1028. 
 450. Agro, 508 F.3d at 1029. 
 451. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (2000); Corus Staal BV v. United States (Corus 
Staal II), 502 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 452. See Consol. Bearings Co. V. United States, 166 F. Supp. 2d 580, 587 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2001) (stating that the requirements for the “pure question of law” exception 
are that the plaintiff raise a new argument that is of a purely legal nature, that the 
inquiry not require further agency involvement or fact-finding, and that the inquiry 
not create undue delay or cause expenditure of party time and resources), rev’d 348 
F.3d 997, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 453. Agro, 508 F.3d at 1029. 
 454. Id. at 1030. 
 455. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) (2000). 
 456. Agro, 508 F.3d at 1030. 
 457. Id. at 1030–31. 
 458. Id. at 1032–33. 
 459. Id. at 1030. 
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Federal Circuit held that Commerce was not empowered to conduct 
a duty absorption inquiry under § 1675(a)(4).460
In American Signature, Inc. v. United States,461 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the CIT’s dismissal of American Signature, Inc.’s (“ASI”) 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for further 
proceedings.462  The case centered on an antidumping investigation 
of wooden bedroom furniture from the People’s Republic of China.463  
During the course of the investigation, Commerce made numerous 
ministerial errors that affected the cash deposit rates.464  After 
publication of the preliminary determination, Commerce issued 
revised instructions to correct those errors, but only for entries on or 
after the date of publication of the amended preliminary 
determination.465  Commerce made similar errors in its final 
determination, which it corrected through an amended final 
determination reducing the rates.466  However, in its liquidation 
instructions, it directed Customs to assess duties at the cash deposit 
rates in effect at the time of entry.467  As a result, for entries between 
the date of the preliminary determination and the amended 
preliminary determination, and for entries between the date of the 
final determination and the amended final determination, duties 
were assessed at the cash deposit rates erroneously calculated by 
Commerce.468  ASI challenged Commerce’s liquidation instructions to 
apply the reduced rates retroactively to the interim periods.469
The CIT dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
Specifically, the CIT concluded that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1581(i)(4) was improper because the claim actually challenged the 
final determination and, therefore, it should have been brought 
under § 1581(c), which grants the CIT jurisdiction over final 
reviewable determinations under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.470  The Federal 
Circuit, however, found that liquidation instructions were properly 
reviewed under § 1581(i)(4).471  While the government alleged that 
 
 460. Id. at 1033. 
 461. No. 2007-1216, 2007 WL 4224210 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 2007).  
 462. Id. at * 1.  
 463. Id.  
 464. Id.  
 465. Id.  
 466. Id.  
 467. Id.  
 468. Id. 
 469. Id.  
 470. Id. at *2.  
 471. Id. (citing Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 348 F.3d 997, 1002–03 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003)) (holding that liquidation instructions are properly reviewed under 
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the true nature of ASI’s challenge was to Commerce’s underlying 
final determination, the Federal Circuit determined that ASI’s claim 
concerned Commerce’s liquidation instructions.472  Thus, it reversed 
the CIT’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with its opinion.473
In Sango International L.P. v. United States,474 the Federal Circuit 
reversed and remanded a CIT decision affirming an antidumping 
duty scope determination.475  The products at issue were imported gas 
meter swivels and gas meter nuts imported by Sango International 
L.P. (“Sango”).476  Commerce had determined that these swivels and 
nuts were within the scope of the antidumping duty order covering 
malleable iron pipe fittings from the People’s Republic of China 
based on factors set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1), which include 
the descriptions of the merchandise in the petition, initial 
investigation, and other determinations by Commerce and the ITC.477  
Only if those descriptions are not dispositive should Commerce 
consider the enumerated criteria of 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2).  
Commerce found that the description according to the sources listed 
in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) was dispositive.478
The CIT determined that the products did not fall within the 
express exceptions within the antidumping order, and thereby held 
that Commerce’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.479  
The Federal Circuit, however, found that the language of the relevant 
documents relied upon by Commerce did not provide substantial 
evidence to support Commerce’s scope determination.480  The 
Federal Circuit specifically examined the evidence suggesting that gas 
meter swivels and nuts differ from “traditional” pipe fittings because 
the flanged end of the swivel only mates and seals to a gas meter 
through the use of a meter nut.481  Thus, the swivels and meter nuts 
served no purpose in a piping system without a gas meter.482  The 
Federal Circuit found that the fittings covered by the order serve to 
connect only to pipes, while gas meter swivels and nuts never appear 
 
 476. Id. at 1375. 
§ 1581(i)(4) because they concern the administration and enforcement of 
Commerce’s final determination). 
 472. Id.   
 473. Id. 
 474. 484 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 475. Id. at 1382. 
 477. Id. at 1377. 
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. 
 480. Id. at 1381–82. 
 481. Id. at 1381. 
 482. Id. 
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in a piping system without a gas meter.483  Thus, the Federal Circuit 
held that Commerce should have considered the additional criteria 
set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) to determine whether gas 
meter swivels and nuts are within the scope of the Order.484
B. United States International Trade Commission 
The ITC is charged with determining whether the domestic 
industry is materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, or 
whether the imports or sales of subject merchandise have materially 
retarded the establishment of a U.S. industry.485  Only if the ITC 
makes an affirmative injury determination, can Commerce issue an 
antidumping or, in most cases, countervailing duty order.486  Two CIT 
decisions in ITC cases were appealed to the Federal Circuit in 2007, 
both dealing with issues of the ITC’s material injury determination.487
In Cleo Inc. v. United States,488 the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s 
decision upholding a determination by the ITC that imports of bulk 
and consumer tissue paper from China were materially injuring the 
domestic tissue paper industry.489  Cleo Inc. (“Cleo”) and Target 
Corp. (“Target”) were domestic companies importing tissue paper 
from China.490  Both companies appealed the ITC’s like product 
determination and material injury determination on four points: 
(1) that the Commission incorrectly found that bulk and consumer 
tissue paper are a single like product, (2) that the Commission 
improperly considered Cleo’s and Target’s imports in its material 
injury determination and that its causation analysis was thus flawed, 
(3) that the Commission erred in concluding that the domestic 
products were being undersold by the imports, and (4) that the 
Commission used flawed financial data when concluding that the 
domestic industry was in poor health.491
The Federal Circuit first upheld the ITC’s finding that bulk and 
consumer tissue paper constituted a single domestic like product.492  
 
 483. Id. 
 484. Id. at 1382. 
 485. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000). 
 486. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e, 1673e (2000). 
 487. Cleo Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Nippon Steel 
Corp. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 494 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 488. 501 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 489. Id. at 1297. 
 490. Id. at 1294. 
 491. Id. at 1296. 
 492. Id. at 1298.  The ITC weighs six factors in considering a like product 
determination:  (1) physical characteristics and uses; (2) common manufacturing 
facilities and production employees; (3) interchangeability; (4) customer 
perceptions; (5) channels of distribution; and, where appropriate, (6) price.  Id. at 
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The court found that bulk and consumer tissue paper were similar in 
physical appearance and use, both coming from jumbo rolls of tissue 
paper, and coming in a variety of sizes and colors.493  The 
manufacturing and production processes were also similar, in that 
both were produced by the same companies on the same machines 
run by the same employees.494  On the other hand, there was only 
limited overlap between the types of tissue paper with regard to 
channels of distribution and price.495  The evidence suggested that 
consumer tissue paper is generally higher in price than bulk.496  
However, the Federal Circuit determined that the significant overlap 
in physical characteristics and uses as well as in manufacturing 
processes, and some overlap in the other factors was sufficient to find 
that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial 
evidence.497
The Federal Circuit also upheld the ITC’s determinations that the 
dumped imports were causing the material injury to the domestic 
tissue paper industry and that the volume of dumped tissue paper 
increased sharply over the period examined.498  The increase in 
volume led to a transfer in market share from domestic producers to 
the importers, resulting in a decline in the domestic tissue paper 
industry.499  Also, the Federal Circuit upheld the ITC’s determination 
that imported tissue paper was significantly undercutting the 
domestic industry’s prices.500  The ITC compared four categories of 
goods:  white consumer tissue paper, solid consumer tissue paper, 
combination color consumer tissue paper, and white bulk tissue 
paper.501  The data showed that imports undersold the domestic 
product a significant amount of time.502  Therefore, the ITC’s 
underlying determinations regarding the scope of the industry and 
material injury analysis were found to be supported by substantial 
evidence.503
 
1295 (citing Torrington Co. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1278, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 
NMB Sing. Ltd. v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1313 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003); 
Timken Co. v. United States, 913 F. Supp. 580, 584 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996)). 
 493. Id. at 1297. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. 
 496. Id. at 1298. 
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. at 1300–01. 
 499. Id. 
 500. Id. at 1303. 
 501. Id. at 1302. 
 502. Id. 
 503. Id. at 1303. 
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In the latest installment of Nippon Steel v. U.S. International Trade 
Commission,504 the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision and 
directed the CIT to reinstate the ITC’s affirmative material injury 
determination.505  The sunset review of Nippon Steel has a long 
procedural history spanning more than six years, and including four 
determinations by the ITC and six opinions from the CIT.506  The 
facts relevant to this case started in 2001, when the ITC “affirmatively 
determined, by a three-to-three vote of the Commissioners, that 
revocation of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders 
covering [grain oriented electrical steel (“GOES”)] from Italy and 
Japan was likely to cause material injury to an industry in the United 
States.”507  The matter was appealed and remanded twice with 
affirmative material injury determinations.508  On the third remand, 
after re-opening the record, but before the voting, Commissioner 
Miller left the Commission.509  Neither the departing Commissioner 
nor her replacement took part in the voting, resulting in a three-to-
two negative determination that revocation of the orders would not 
likely cause material injury to the domestic industry.510  The CIT 
affirmed this negative determination.511
As in Tung Mung Development Co. v. United States,512 the government 
attempted to portray the issue as involving an independent change of 
agency policy.513  In Tung Mung, the appellant steel company 
challenged an interim CIT decision as improper because it failed to 
give deference to Commerce’s decision to use a certain method when 
calculating the appropriate antidumping duty.514  Here, in its analysis 
of the issue, the Federal Circuit found that the change in the 
Commission’s vote was solely a product of the departure of a 
Commissioner.515  The court noted that a similar situation occurred in 
Altx, Inc. v. United States,516 in which the court found that a change in 
the identity of the voting Commissioners did not amount to an 
independent policy change by the Commission.517  Therefore, the 
 
 504. 494 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 505. Id. at 1381. 
 506. Id. at 1373. 
 507. Id. at 1373–74 (citation omitted). 
 508. Id. at 1374. 
 509. Id. 
 510. Id. 
 511. Id. at 1375. 
 512. 354 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 513. Nippon Steel, 494 F.3d at 1375. 
 514. Tung Mung Dev., 354 F.3d at 1378. 
 515. Nippon Steel, 494 F.3d at 1376. 
 516. 370 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 517. Id. at 1118–19 n.8. 
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Federal Circuit found that weighing the evidence differently than the 
old majority of Commissioners did not amount to a change in 
Commission practice or policy.518
Also of note, the Federal Circuit found it appropriate to review the 
remand order de novo, rather than for abuse of discretion, because 
of the remand instructions it gave to the Commission.519  Namely, it 
gave two options on how to proceed:  “(1) reopen the record in order 
to obtain substantial evidence to support its adverse impact 
conclusion or (2) make a determination that subject imports will 
have no adverse impact should the orders be revoked.”520  This made 
the remand order precisely the type that is reviewed de novo, and not 
for abuse of discretion. 
The Commission’s cumulation of imports, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1675a(a)(7), was further upheld by the Federal Circuit as 
supported by substantial evidence.521  The Commission has discretion 
to “cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports of the subject 
merchandise from all countries with respect to reviews . . . [that] were 
initiated on the same day, if such imports would be likely to compete 
with each other and with domestic like products in the United States 
market.”522  The Commission reasoned that there was direct 
competition between Italian and Japanese imports, that the like 
domestic product was substitutable for the subject imports, and that 
the two countries shared similar channels of distribution.523  Given the 
evidence of higher prices for GOES in the United States, which 
supported the finding that imports were likely to have an adverse 
impact on the domestic industry, the Federal Circuit held that the 
ITC’s material injury determination was supported by substantial 
evidence.524
The international trade decisions of the Federal Circuit show the 
importance of keeping informed about evolving developments in 
trade remedy matters, and not only when they involve products that a 
company exports to, or imports into, the United States.  The court’s 
decisions on appeals from Commerce determinations also 
demonstrate that, at least in the context of regulations interpreting 
antidumping duty statutes, the Federal Circuit is likely to uphold 
 
 518. Nippon Steel, 494 F.3d at 1377–78. 
 519. Id. at 1378–79. 
 520. Id. at 1378 (quoting Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 2d 
1258, 1284 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005)). 
 521. Id. at 1379–80. 
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 1196 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1145 
Commerce’s position because the agency has been granted broad 
discretion in such matters by Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2007, The Federal Circuit decided thirty-four appeals from the 
CIT, sixteen of which involved customs issues and eighteen of which 
involved trade remedy issues.  The Federal Circuit addressed a wide 
range of international trade issues, representative of the varied and 
complex nature of the international trade cases normally appealed to 
the court.  Although international trade appeals continue to be only 
a small percentage of the Federal Circuit’s total caseload, these 
appeals are very important, not only for the litigants, but also for 
others who are similarly situated. 
 
